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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays.
In the rst essay, Kai Ding and I develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in
which a change in the importance of rm specic human capital can explain the new
pattern in labor productivity as well as partially account for the decrease in the rate of
employment recovery (jobless recoveries) observed in the most recent three recessions.
Additionally, we present empirical support that the importance of rm specic human
capital has in fact increased for recent recessions.
In the second essay, David Perez-Reyna and I incorporate theft in a macroeconomic
setting with the goal of understanding the eects of public law enforcement (PLE) on
the incarceration rate, aggregate output and average welfare. Our primary nding is
that there exists a non-monotonic relation between the level of PLE and all three of
these aggregate variables. In particular, for countries with relatively small amounts of
PLE, there is an inverse relationship between PLE and both aggregate production and
welfare primarily due to an increase in the incarceration rate. However, for countries
with higher levels of PLE, the level is positively related to production and welfare and
inversely related with the incarceration rate. When applied to a dynamic model, our
mechanism can explain why we observe such a large dierence in the level of PLE across
countries.
In the third essay, David Perez-Reyna and I present a general equilibrium model
where heterogeneous consumers endogenously choose whether to become workers, con-
sumers or entrepreneurs in order to analyze how limits on the leverage of banks aect
real output. In our model tighter limits on the leverage of banks cause an increase in
the spread between the interest rate that banks charge for loans and the interest rate
that banks pay for deposits. A higher spread results in two types of distortions: First,
rms with the same productivity will have dierent size. Second, productive rms will
cease to exist, while nonproductive ones will enter. These distortions result in lower
production.
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Chapter 1
Cautious Hiring: An Explanation
for Changes in the Labor Cycle
1.1 Introduction
Even nearly ve years after the end of the 2008 recession, unemployment rates continue
to remain above levels experienced in the 15 years prior to the recession. This slow rate
of recovery in the unemployment rate is a phenomenon shared with the two previous
recessions but contrasts sharply with the faster recoveries in unemployment rates prior
to the early 1990s. This emergent pattern has commonly been referred to among poli-
cymakers, journalists as well as in the economic literature as jobless recovery1. Jobless
recoveries refer to periods following recessions in which rebounds in aggregate output
are accompanied by much slower recoveries in aggregate employment2.
A second empirical fact that has been documented in the literature is that for these
same three recessions the previously procyclical pattern in labor productivity has re-
versed3. In fact, for the most recent three recessions the drop in aggregate production
is accompanied by an increase in labor productivity. We conjecture that these changes
are linked and propose a mechanism that can simultaneously account for both changes.
Namely, the increase in relative productivity of experienced to inexperienced workers.
1For examples in the literature refer to Gordon (1993), Bernanke (2003), Gal, Smets, and Wouters
(2012) and Jaimovich and Siu (2012)
2Denition taken from Jaimovich and Siu (2012)
3See McGrattan and Prescott (2012) and Gal and van Rens (2010) for examples.
1
2New to our model is the idea that workers develop rm specic human capital,
new workers are relatively unproductive compared with experienced workers in the
same job. Since this human capital is rm specic, it is not fully reected in the
wage. Consequently, the rm makes an investment in new workers and earns a prot on
experienced workers. In this sense, the set of experienced workers with a rm constitute
a human capital stock which the rm manages. Hiring new workers lowers the average
prots of the rm and makes bankruptcy more likely. Bankruptcy is costly to rms since
it causes a loss of their experienced workers. Firms can receive a higher rate of growth
only in exchange for a larger probability of default. As a result rms hire cautiously and
grow slowly. A key parameter in our model is the relative productivity of experienced
workers to inexperienced workers. As this ratio increases, the cost of bankruptcy also
increases and rms endogenously choose to grow more slowly.
When the economy is recovering from a recession, startup rms have two opposing
forces on labor productivity. On the one hand, average size of startup rms is small due
to cautious hiring. Due to decreasing returns to scale in the labor input, this tends to
increase the average labor productivity. We interpret this as a larger capital to worker
ratio. The second and countering force is that after the recession, startup rms desire to
grow which results in a larger proportion of inexperienced workers. These newly hired
workers have lower productivity in their new positions than their more experienced
counterparts which drives down average labor productivity.
In a fast recovery the later eect outweighs the former causing labor productivity to
be procyclical, when a recovery is slower the downward eects of newly hired workers
is diluted across time which causes the returns to scale eect to dominate. We use a
change in the relative productivity of experienced to inexperienced workers to generate
a change in the speed of recovery. While our mechanism does not account for the
entirety of the change in average labor productivity over the business cycle between
older and more recent recessions, it can account for roughly half of what we observe in
the data. Additionally, our benchmark model is able to qualitatively replicate the shift
in productivity from being procyclical in earlier recessions and countercyclical in more
recent recessions.
Ever since the recession of the early 1990s a number of macroeconomists includ-
ing Gal, Smets, and Wouters (2012), Gordon (1993), Groshen and Potter (2003), and
3Bernanke (2003) have discussed the slower rate of recovery in labor through recent busi-
ness cycles. Still, no consensus on the cause of the change in the speed of employment
recovery has emererged. Our model suggests that one of the reasons for the change in
the speed of recovery is explained by a change in the importance of rm specic human
capital since the mid 1980s.
We propose that the more technical and job specic the skills demanded by employers
are, the greater the relative value of an experienced worker relative to an inexperienced
one. Multiple strands in the literature provide support that this parameter has been
changing in the last couple of decades. Specically, the rise of computers has been
cited as a substitute for routine labor and a complement for nonroutine cognitive tasks
as presented in the empirical work of Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003). That this
phenomena is at the core of the business cycle is further documented in Jaimovich and
Siu (2012). Related to this literature is the growing work documenting that employment
is becoming increasingly concentrated in the tails of the occupational skill distribution
as seen in Acemoglu (1999), Autor and Dorn (2013), Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006)
Goos and Manning (2007) and Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2009).
In addition to changes in the importance of rm specic skills for a job, our mecha-
nism relies on consideration of a rm's labor decision as a form of investment. Our work
builds upon the seminal work of Becker (1964) in the sense that the costs and returns
of rm-specic training are largely attributed to rms. This gap between the marginal
product of labor and wages ties into a vast theoretical literature including Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) and Lazear (1979) as well as a sparser empirical literature on the
topic. This arises largely due to the diculties which lie in determining the marginal
contributions of a single worker in the context of a rm with multiple employees working
on a common output4.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2 we document the
two main features of the more recent recessions. Section 1.3 presents the model and
denition of equilibrium. In Section 1.4 we present our steady state results. Section
1.5 calibrates our parameters to the data. In Section 1.6 we present the business cycle
properties and section 1.7 concludes.
4For examples of such papers which attempt to measure gains in marginal output independent of
wages see Shaw and Lazear (2008) or Isen (2012).
41.2 Data
Ever since the double dip recession in the early 1980s a number of new patterns emerge
in the macroeconomic data, in this section we highlight two of them. Well cited in the
literature is that recoveries in unemployment rate have been slower in the recessions in
the 1990s onwards when compared with prior recessions. Perhaps even more signicant
is that these recoveries in unemployment are not only slower, but that they are also
slower relative to the recovery in GDP. Another way to observe this same fact is to
look at the correlation between average labor productivity and GDP over the business
cycle. If we measure average labor productivity as real output per hour worked, then
if GDP recovers more slowly than labor productivity, recessions will be characterized
by a pro-cyclical relation between these two series which is what we observe across
business cycles through the \double dip" recession of the early 1980s. Alternatively,
if GDP recovers faster than labor productivity, recessions will be characterized by a
counter-cyclical relation between these two series which is precisely what we observe in
the recessions following 1990.
The unemployment rate between January of 1967 through March of 2014 is displayed
in Figure 1.2. As can be observed in the gure, the speed of recovery in the unemploy-
ment rate following the three most recent recessions has been signicantly slower than
in prior recessions.
Figure 1.1: Civilian Unemployment Rate - Jan. 1967-Mar. 2014
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Source: Current Population Survey5
5In order to observe this more clearly, Table 1.1 displays the dierence in unemploy-
ment between the end of each of the last six recessions and each of the following ve
years. In recessions prior to the mid 1980s recovery in unemployment following the low
point in GDP growth began immediately and continued in the following ve years. Con-
trast that with the most recent three recessions where unemployment has stayed fairly
level or even increased in the rst two to three years following the recession and even
ve years after the recession the unemployment rate recovery lags by approximately two
percentage points behind the earlier recessions6.
Table 1.1: Unemployment Recovery
NBER Recession Dif. in UR Between Recession End and Select Dates
End Date UR 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years
Fast Recovery Recessions
11/1970 5.9 -0.1 0.6 1.1 NA NA
03/1975 8.6 1 1.2 2.3 2.8 2.3
11/1982 10.8 2.3 3.6 3.8 3.9 5
Average 1.07 1.80 2.40 3.35 3.65
Slow Recovery Recessions
03/1991 6.8 -0.9 -0.9 -0.2 0.8 0.8
11/2001 5.5 -0.4 -0.7 -0.2 0.3 0.9
06/2009 9.5 0.1 0.4 1.3 2 NA
Average -0.40 -0.40 0.30 1.03 0.85
Source: Current Population Survey and NBER recession dates. Author's calculations
Our second and related fact is that unemployment rate recoveries slowly relative to
the recovery in GDP. Figure 1.2 displays the 10 year centered moving average correlation
between labor productivity and GDP. Each point in the series uses 10 years of seasonally
5Data are taken from the Labor Force Statistics of the CPS, downloaded from the BLS website
(http://www.bls.gov/data/) on April 10, 2014. As in the footnote on page 3 of Jaimovich and Siu
(2012), Employment data at the aggregate and occupational level are available dating back to 1959.
However, there are well-documented issues with the early CPS data, especially during the 1961 recession;
see, for instance, the 1962 report of the President's Committee to Appraise Employment and Unem-
ployment Statistics entitled \Measuring Employment and Unemployment." The recommendations of
this report (commonly referred to as the Gordon report) led to methodological changes adopted by the
BLS beginning in 1967 (Stein (1967)). As such, our analysis uses data beginning in July 1967.
6The 1980 recession is omitted due to the proximity of the following recession. For the same reason
certain dates following the 1971 recession are not included
6adjusted HP ltered GDP and real output per hour data surrounding the displayed date
to calculate the correlation. Prior to the mid 1980s Labor Productivity was procyclical,
however in the time following the mid 1980s labor productivity has been acyclical or
even slightly counter cyclical.
Figure 1.2: 10 Year Centered MA Correlation in Labor Productivity and GDP
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Bureau of Economic Analysis
This change has particularly aected the behavior of these series during and im-
mediately following each recession. In the three most recent recessions prior to 1990
(which we will label the \Fast Recoveries,") the two series behaved similarly, dropping
with or just before the onset of the recession and recovering fairly quickly following the
recession. However in the three recessions following the cycles featuring fast recovery,
GDP patterns more or less are similar to the earlier recessions with a slight retardation
in the recovery rate whereas labor productivity remains fairly at leading into the reces-
sion, increases rapidly beginning mid recession, and falls a few years after the recession.
These features can be observed in Figures 1.3 and 1.4.
7Figure 1.3: The \Fast Recovery" Recessions
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Authors' calculations
Figure 1.4: The \Slow Recovery" Recessions
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1.3 Environment
There are three types of agents in our model, a representative household, a continuum
of heterogeneous rms, and nancial intermediaries.
The households have preferences over a single consumption good, and they inelasti-
cally supply labor to the rms. The households own the rms and consume the dividends
each period.
Firms operate a decreasing returns to scale technology which produces the consump-
tion good using eective labor as the input. This technology is subject to idiosyncratic
productivity shocks. Firms have to make their hiring decisions before the realization of
the shock.
8Our model features two types of workers distinguished by their experience levels:
junior workers and senior workers. Experience refers to experience with the specic rm
where a worker is employed. In the rst period a worker is at a rm, they are considered
junior with a labor productivity of J , meaning that each unit of labor supplied by the
junior worker will contribute J units of eective labor. After the initial period, junior
workers become senior workers and oer a labor productivity of S > J . Once a worker
becomes senior, he will stay senior forever unless he separates with the rm due to rm
bankruptcy or exogenous separation which happens with probability 1  .
Firms hire labor and must pay the wage bill before production takes place. The wage
payment is nanced through an intra-period loan from the nancial intermediaries.
The nancial intermediaries are risk neutral and oer one-period state-uncontingent
loans to rms. Firms default on their debt if current period revenue falls short of the
payment due. Upon default, all revenues are seized by the nancial intermediaries and
the rms' stock of senior workers is lost. The higher the default probability, the higher
interest rate the rm is required to pay on their loan.
The timing is as follows. In the beginning of each period, rms make hiring decisions,
nancial intermediaries lend funds to rms and wages are paid. Next, productivity
shocks are realized, output is produced, and revenues are earned. Firms repay loans to
nancial intermediaries if able and pay out the remaining prots as dividends to the
households, otherwise they declare bankruptcy. Firms that have defaulted enter again
in the next period with zero senior workers.
9Figure 1.5: Timing of the Model
1.3.1 Households
In our model, there is a measure L of households. The households' problem is static
and trivial. Each period they supply labor inelastically to the rms and consume the
dividends paid out by the rms. The only part of the household problem which will
be relevant for the general equilibrium solution will be the stochastic discount factor
which rms will use to weight future payouts in various states of the world. Therefore,
for simplicity, we model each household as being identical and comprised of the average
share of senior, junior and unemployed workers. The households' problem is given by:
max
fctg10
1X
t=0
E

tu(ct)

s.t. ct  wJt sJt + wSt sSt + dt; for all t
where sJt and s
S
t represent the share of junior and senior employed workers in the
economy.
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The stochastic discount factor of the households is given by:
t 
E
h
u
0
(ct+1)
i
u0(ct)
In equilibrium, the resource constraint implies that consumption for each household
is equal to the total output of the economy divided by the measure of households:
ct =
Yt
L
1.3.2 Firms
Hiring Decision
There is a measure 1 of rms. They each produce a homogenous good according to the
production function y
 
z; nJ ; nS

= z

JnJ + SnS

, where z  F is an idiosyncratic
productivity shock which is iid across rms and time. Firms enter each period with
nS senior workers and decide how many junior workers nJ to hire. Firms nance their
wage bill, which can be written as
 
wSnS + wJnJ

, by taking out an intra-period loan
from the nancial intermediary. Next they receive their productivity shock z and pro-
duce. If the revenue from selling their nal good is sucient to pay back the nancial
intermediary, rms pay back their debt, distribute the remaining prots as dividends to
the households and continue in the next period with 
 
nJ + nS

senior workers, where
1   is the exogenous separation rate between rms and workers. If the proceeds from
output sales are insucient to pay back nancial intermediaries, rms go bankrupt. All
the revenue is conscated by the lenders, and in the next period rms start over with
no senior workers.
We assume that at the end of each period rms pay out all prots (if any) as
dividends and do not permit rms to retain earnings. There exists a large literature in
nance which argues that there are substantial costs of maintaining a large buer stock.
For example Jensen (1986) argued that, in practice, if rms retain a large amount of their
earnings in order to build up a buer, managers use these funds in ways that benet their
private interests rather than the shareholder interests. Since shareholders understand
these incentives, they give the managers incentives to pay out funds immediately rather
11
than retain them. We crudely model this eect by preventing rms from retaining any
earnings. For brand new start-up rms this assumption makes no dierence in the
rst period but does tighten the constraint in subsequent periods compared to the case
where rms are able to retain earnings. Allowing retention of earnings weakens our
result quantitatively but not qualitatively.
We normalize the price of nal output to be P = 1 and measure wage rates wJ ; wS
in real output.
Firms' decision solves the following Bellman equation:
V (nS) = max
nJ
8><>:
Z 1
z(nJ ;nS)
h
z

nSS + nJJ
    wSnS + wJnJR  nJ ; nSi f(z)dz
+

F
 
z
 
nJ ; nS

V (0) +
 
1  F  z  nJ ; nSV   nS + nJ
9>=>;
where z
 
nJ ; nS

is the cuto level of productivity for bankruptcy and R
 
nJ ; nS

is
the interest rate schedule charged by the nancial intermediaries.
Wage Bargaining
In our model, junior and senior workers have dierent levels of labor productivity due
to dierences in rm specic human capital. We abstract from general human capital,
assuming that wage rates fully compensate workers for any dierences in marginal pro-
ductivity which arise from these dierences. In contrast with general human capital,
rm specic human capital does not improve the worker's outside option and therefore
is not fully reected in the wage rate. The market for junior workers is competitive
and market clearing determines wJ : However, no market exists for senior workers with
a specic rm. Therefore, we use a novel approach to Nash Bargaining between senior
workers and the rm to determine the wage. This approach will also presents a clean
method of empirically identifying 
S
J
. The details of the bargaining decision are included
in Table 1.2.
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Table 1.2: Nash Bargaining to Determine Wages
Match Separate (Outside Option)
Senior Worker Surplus wS wJ
Firm Surplus
S
J
 wJ   wS 0
Total Surplus
S
J
 wJ wJ
A senior worker that chooses to stay with the rm receives a wage of wS whereas
if he chooses to look for work elsewhere, the worker looses their rm specic human
capital and receives the wage of junior workers wJ . Unlike most matching models, the
surplus to the rm is not the lost production of the worker. The rm is able to hire as
many junior workers as they would like at wage wJ which can perfectly substitute for
the production of the senior worker. Therefore, the surplus derived for a rm employing
a senior worker is the savings in wage bill, 
S
J
wJ  wS , where the rst term is the wage
bill required to replace the production from one senior worker by employing 
S
J
junior
workers.7 If the rm and worker separate then the rm receives 0 surplus from the
relationship since the match no longer exists. For simplicity, we assume there is no
commitment between rms and workers and so the bargaining is only based on the
static portion of the surplus since the contract will be renegotiated again next period.
Given this setup, wS is dened as:
wS = argmax
wS

S
J
 wJ   wS
1 NB  
wS   wJNB (1.1)
where NB is the bargaining weight of workers.
Solving Equation 1.1 gives:
7To be exact, this amount is actually an upper bound in the savings for the rm. As long as the
bargaining weight of workers NB < 1 the unit cost of eective labor varies between senior and junior
workers and therefore aects the decision on the optimal amount of labor to hire. Since this is an
overestimate on the surplus derived from the match, this leads to an overestimate on the ratio of the
senior wage premium w
S
wJ
which causes senior workers to be less valuable to the rm (since they cost
more) and consequently lowers the eectiveness of our mechanism. In this sense this assumption works
against our result and our resulting estimates serve as a lower bound for the eect this mechanism has
on the slow recovery in recent recessions.
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wS   wJ = NB

S
J
 wJ   wJ

;
which implies
wS
wJ
  1 = NB

S
J
  1

: (1.2)
This equation 1.2 has an intuitive interpretation. Only a portion NB of the gains
in productivity of senior workers relative to junior workers are reected in their wage.
There are two implications from this equation. First, the wage of senior workers relative
to junior workers is a proxy for the improvement in productivity for senior workers and
therefore, we can use data on changes in the wage bill to give us an indirect measure
of the ratio of 
S
J
. Second, senior workers are more valuable to a rm relative to junior
workers.
In equilibrium, since rms compete for workers in the labor market, hiring a junior
worker is a costly investment by rms which pays o when the worker becomes senior. In
this sense, senior workers are valuable for the rm and should the rm face bankruptcy,
the loss of senior workers represent a real cost to the rm. For this reason rms are
cautious in their hiring in order to balance growth against the risk of losing their senior
worker stock.
1.3.3 Financial Intermediaries
Competitive nancial intermediaries make intra-period loans to the rms. Since pro-
ductivity shocks are i.i.d. across rms, nancial intermediaries are not subject to any
aggregate revenue uncertainty. They choose an interest rate schedule R
 
nJ ; nS

based
on the number of senior workers nS and junior workers nJ at the rm. Interest rate
schedule R and cuto productivity level z for bankruptcy are jointly determined by:
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z

nSS + nJJ

= R
 
wSnS + wJnJ

(1.3)
wSnS + wJnJ =
8><>:
 
1  F  z  nJ ; nSR  wSnS + wJnJ
+
Z z(nJ ;nS)
0
z

nSS + nJJ

f(z)dz
9>=>; (1.4)
where the Equation 1.3 denes the cuto level in productivity draws z below which
rms are unable to repay the loan and Equation 1.4 is the break even condition for
risk neutral lenders. We assume that intra-period loans from nancial intermediaries
are state-uncontingent. Therefore, rms cannot use these loans to hedge against their
productivity risks. This lack of insurance arises when there is some asymmetric informa-
tion between the rm and the nancial intermediaries. For example, if the productivity
shocks are unobservable by the nancial intermediaries.
1.3.4 Recursive Stationary Equilibrium
Denition 1. A recursive stationary equilibrium consists of a value function V , a policy
function nJ(nS), prices

wJ ; wS ; R(nJ ; nS)
	
, a measure of rms g(nS), and output Y
such that:
1. Given wH ; wS ; R
 
nJ ; nS

: nJ(nS) solves rm's Bellman equation with V as a
solution
V (nS) =
max
nJ
8><>:
Z 1
z(nJ ;nS)
h
z

nSS + nJJ
    wSnS + wJnJR  nJ ; nSi f(z)dz
+

F
 
z
 
nJ ; nS

V (0) +
 
1  F  z  nJ ; nSV   nS + nJ
9>=>;
where
z

nSS + nJJ

= R
 
nJ ; nS
  
wSnS + wJnJ

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2. Financial intermediaries break even with R
 
nJ ; nS

 
wSnS + wJnJ

=
8><>:
 
1  F  z  nJ ; nSR  wSnS + wJnJ
+
Z z(nJ ;nS)
0
z

nSS + nJJ

f(z)dz
9>=>;
3. Final good market clears
Y =
Z
z
Z
nS
z

nJ(nS)J + nSS

g(nS)dnSdF (z)
4. Labor market clears
L =
Z
nS

nJ(nS) + nS

g(nS)dnS
1.4 Stationary Equilibrium
To illustrate the intuition of our model, we use the following metaphor.
In our model, senior workers are more productive than junior workers. Since the
skills accumulated by senior workers are rm specic, a senior worker's outside option is
no dierent than a junior worker and the surplus of these skills are split via bargaining
between the senior worker and the rm. In this sense, senior workers are a valuable
resources for rms. Due to wages being set through market clearing in the labor market,
the wage rate for junior workers is above their expected productivity and in this sense
junior workers are like an investment where they bring in a negative expected return
in the initial period and the positive payo only comes in the future once the junior
worker transitions into a senior worker.8 The investment in junior workers is risky
because junior workers lower the average current period revenue of the rm and hence
increase the probability that the rm goes bankrupt.
A rm enters a period with a stock of senior workers which produce a positive
expected cash ow for the rm. It uses these senior workers to compensate for the
8Hiring a junior workers is costly in the period of hiring because the expected productivity of the
worker is lower than his wage. However, when the junior worker turns senior in the next period, his
expected productivity is higher than his wage and hence the worker contributes to the rms expected
protability.
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expected losses from hiring junior workers. Those junior workers which are retained
convert into senior workers in the following period. However, the risky nature of hiring
junior workers make the rm cautious in hiring them too quickly. The more senior
workers a rm has, the less susceptible the rm is to the risk of hiring junior workers,
and hence the more a rm would optimally choose to hire. As a result, a start-up rm
will hire fewer junior workers relative to a rm with a large stock of senior workers.
As rms gradually accumulate enough senior workers, they will reach a satiation point
due to the decreasing returns to scale technology. At this point, rms hire just enough
junior workers each period to compensate for the exogenous separation of senior workers.
This generates a life-cycle growth path of a rm: slowest when rst started, gradually
increasing over age, and eventually reaching the optimal size.
Refer to Figure 1.6 for sample policy functions with varying levels of senior worker
human capital S : In the case where senior and junior workers are equally productive
(S = J), the optimal size of a rm is reached in the initial period no matter how many
senior workers the rm starts with. This is because junior workers are as productive
as senior workers and no longer incur an initial investment upon hiring (nor do senior
worker oer a positive expected return in this setting.) In this case the problem is static
and there is no state variable. When we introduce a dierence in the productivity levels
between senior and junior workers (S > J), optimal size of a rm is gradually reached
as the rm balances growth against risk of bankruptcy.
Figure 1.6: Hiring Policy for Firms of Dierent Sizes
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In terms of the probability of default, the more senior workers a rm has, the higher
the average current period revenue, and hence the less likely to default. This generates
a downward sloping default probability with respect to rm size which is qualitatively
consistent with the data.
Next consider a comparative statics experiment where S=J is increased. This
change will make junior workers even less productive relative to senior workers. This
makes the upfront cost of hiring junior workers higher and the cost of going bankrupt
higher.9 Both of these eects will slow down the hiring of junior workers. As displayed
in Figure 1.7 the data displays a pattern that could be explained by an increase in the
ratio of S=J in that for recent years, rms are initially smaller and that they grow
more slowly.
Figure 1.7: Growth Rate of Firm Size over Age for Dierent S=J Ratios
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9The upfront cost is higher because junior workers produces even less relative to their wage. Cost
of bankruptcy is higher because senior workers produce even more than their wage, and hence are even
more painful to lose upon bankruptcy.
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1.5 Quantitative Analysis
1.5.1 Determining the relation between J and S
Of crucial importance to our model is the contribution of rm specic human capital to
the eectiveness of labor. More specically that portion of rm specic human capital
which is not reected in the wage. In practice, apart from the wage, disentangling the
marginal contribution of a specic worker is quite dicult as production from most
rms involves the coordinated eort of multiple individuals completing various tasks
both separately and in groups. Still, there do exist some attempts in the literature to
identify the gains in worker productivity from experience without relying on the wage
data10.
One attempt at quantifying the gains to experience is Shaw and Lazear (2008), which
documents that output increases dramatically in the rst year and a half of employment
but that pay proles are much atter than output proles over the corresponding period.
In order to document the marginal contribution of individual workers, Shaw and Lazear
(2008) use data from an industry where output can be quantied and directly linked to
an individual worker, namely they study a rm which installs windshields. According to
their paper, \A drawback of the data is that it is surely an underestimate of the returns
to skill development across occupations." This is due to the relatively easy learning
curve involved in windshield installation. Even still, Shaw and Lazear (2008) nd that
the average output gain over the rst 12 months on the job in this industry for workers
employed at a constant hourly rate is 62% while the corresponding change in the wage
prole for the same period is 0%. We use these ndings to make two claims. First
the gains in output from tenure, especially at tenure less than one year, are signicant.
And second, that the gains in output at the beginning of tenure with a rm are largely
unreected in the corresponding wage.
While papers which study the eects of tenure on output for a specic industry are
suggestive, we need to calibrate the relative productivity of senior to junior workers
across all industries and demonstrate that it has increased over time. As outlined in
Section 1.3 we hypothesize that gains in rm specic human capital are split between
workers and rms. In order to identify the magnitude of the relative productivity
10See Isen (2012) or Shaw and Lazear (2008) for examples
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between senior and junior workers, we employ data from the CPS Displaced Workers,
Occupational Mobility and Job Tenure supplements. We use the average wage change
of workers who have been displaced from a job for economic reasons (layos or plant
closings) to discipline our selection of S and J .11 We use this loss in wages for workers
who were displaced due to exogenous reasons in order to isolate that portion of the wage
which can be attributed towards rm specic human capital.
Using data from the displaced worker supplement of the CPS data is advantageous
for a number of reasons. In general, it is dicult to disentangle returns to general
experience and tenure. The displaced worker supplement provides wage data on specic
workers both before and after separation which partially12 controls for returns to general
experience and allows us to isolate returns to tenure. Second, the CPS data permits
us to limit the selection eects of separation since the supplement allows us to just use
those workers who were separated due to exogenous reasons such as plant closure.
The average change in real wages after an exogenous job loss is displayed in Figure
1.8. The drop in wages following an exogenous separation is aected by the business
cycle. Specically, the rst survey conducted immediately following a recession gives
a drop in wages larger than the average drop experienced immediately following or
preceeding the survey. Panel A of Figure 1.8 includes all data points whereas Panel
B of Figure 1.8 excludes the rst point following each NBER recession. The series
are overlayed with the data from Figure 1.2 which demonstrates a strong correlation
between changes in the real wage and patterns in labor productivity over the business
cycle providing suggesting evidence linking our mechanism and result.
11Similar to the method used by Topel (1991)
12Depending on the year of the survey, those interviewed are asked if they were placed in the preceding
1 to 5 years. The fact that general experience tends to increase wages causes our estimate of S=J to
be biased downwards both for older and more recent recessions.
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Figure 1.8: Evidence for Changes in S=J
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In order to determine the portion of rm specic human capital which is reected in
the wage data, we adopt the wage bargaining parameter used in Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008) of NB = 0:05. The fact that wages are only moderately procyclical pins down
the worker's bargaining weight at a relatively low value13. Using the drop in wages for
displaced workers from the CPS supplement for periods before and after the mid 1980s
and a Nash Bargaining Weight for Senior Workers of 0:05 we t S=J = 2 for the
recessions characterized by fast recoveries in the employment sector14 and S=J = 4
for the recessions characterized by slow recoveries in the employment sector15. For
additional details on the selection of S=J refer to A.1
1.5.2 Parameterization
Our model includes nine parameters in the stationary equilibrium and an additional
parameter to determine the magnitude of the shock. The parameters in our model
are calibrated using exogenous moments in the data or are selected according to levels
standard in the literature. We apply a constant relative risk aversion utility function
for households of the form:
13Using a low wage bargaining parameter implies productivity gains for senior workers which are in
line with the magnitude of the ndings of Shaw and Lazear (2008)
14Those recessions occurring prior to the mid 1980s
15Those recessions occurring post the mid 1980s
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u (c) =
c1    1
1   :
Each period in our model represents a year and we select a household discount rate
of = 0:96 to match an annual interest rate of 4%. We choose a household relative
risk aversion of  = 5 in line with work in the asset pricing literature and with Kehoe,
Midrigan, and Pastorino (2014).
Labor share in the production function is chosen to be  = 0:6. Exogenous separa-
tion rate between rms and workers is chosen to be 1    = 0:1 to match an average
employment spell of 2:5 years as in Shimer (2005). We normalize the measure of rms
to M = 1 and select a total measure of workers in the economy of L = 16 to match an
average establishment size of 16.5 employees over the past 10 years16. The rm specic
productivity z is i.i.d. over time following the distribution f(z)  U [0; 1]17. Selection
of S=J and the Nash Bargaining weight NB were discussed in the previous section.
To model a recession we introduce a one period, unexpected volatility shock. The
shock is a mean preserving spread on the productivity draws of all rms which increases
the weight of the tails and causes a larger than expected number of rms to fail. For
both the fast recovery recessions and slow recovery recessions we select a shock which
induces a 5% drop in output. For additional information on the nature of our volatility
shock refer to A.2
16Data from Bureau of Labor Statistics, Business Employment Dynamics tables on employment by
establishment and number of establishments
17Note, we assume z follows a uniform distribution for analytic tractability. Our model result is
invariant to the mean of the distribution.
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Table 1.3: Parameterization Table
Parameter Value Description Source
 0:96 Discount Rate Annual Interest Rate 4%
 5 CRRA Parameter Asset Pricing Literature
 0:6 Labor Share 60% Labor Share Income
1   0:1 Exogenous Separation Rate Avg Emp Spell of 2:5 Years
NB 0:05 NB Weight for Workers Hagedorn et. al. (2008)
M 1 Total Measure of Firms Normalization
L 16 Total Measure of Workers Average Size of Firm: BLS
J 1 Prod of New Hired Workers Normalization
Sold 2 Prod of Exp Workers CPS Displayed Worker Survey
Snew 4 Prod of Exp Workers CPS Displayed Worker Survey
1.6 Business Cycle Properties
Based on the parameters calibrated in the last section, we now compare the business
cycle properties of the unemployment rate and average labor productivity generated by
our model to those in the data.
Specically, we compare our model predictions to the data for the three largest
recessions as measured by the change in the unemployment rate: the 1981 recession,
the 1973 recession, and the 2008 recession.
Our model generates recovery in unemployment rates that are of similar speed with
those in the data. It also matches the procyclical pattern of average labor productiv-
ity for the 1973 and 1981 recessions, and the countercyclical pattern in average labor
productivity for the 2008 recession observed in the data.
1.6.1 Model Transition Problem
Our model focuses on the recovery from a recession. For simplicity we model a recession
as a one-time, unexpected increase to the cross-sectional variance of productivity shock
z.18 Then we look at how the economy recovers from the recession. We assume that
18For our mechanism to work, we only need more rms to go bankruptcy during the recession than
in the stationary equilibrium. The cause of the recession is unimportant for purposes of our analysis.
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real wage is sticky during the period of recovery as observed in the data.19
Let the shock happen in period t = 0. We assume that it takes T periods for
the economy to get back to the stationary equilibrium after the shock. The Bellman
equation for individual rms is given by:
Vt(n
S) =
max
nJ
8><>:
Z 1
z(nJ ;nS)
n
z

nJJ + nSS
   wSnS + wJnJR  nJ ; nSo f (z) dz
+t;t+1

F
 
z
 
nJ ; nS

Vt+1 (0) +
 
1  F  z  nJ ; nSVt+1    nS + nJ
9>=>;
where t;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor by the household between period t and pe-
riod t+1. Since wages are assumed to be sticky, the cuto level for productivity z
 
nS

for bankruptcy and the interest rate schedule R
 
nS

charged by nancial intermediaries
remain the same as they are in the stationary equilibrium.
Value functions during the transition are indexed by time t. This is because the dis-
tribution of rms gt
 
nS

is changing over time which will aect the stochastic discount
factors t;t+1.
1.6.2 Algorithm for Solving Transition Dynamics
Our transition problem features heterogeneous rms. Aggregation doesn't hold because
of the decreasing returns to scale production technology. At each point in time, we
have to keep track of the distribution of rms because it aects the total output in
the economy, which in turn aects the stochastic discount factor used by rms to value
payos in dierent states.
We solve for the transition using the following algorithm. Instead of iterating on
a sequence of value functions, we guess and iterate on a sequence of discounted value
functions.
19Since our model does not include a search element, there would be no unemployment in our model
without the use of some form of wage rigidity. In the data wage data is only weakly procyclical.
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1. Guess a sequence of discounted value function fDVt : t = 1; :::; Tg dened by
DVt+1
 
nS
  u0 (Ct+1)
u0 (Ct)
Vt+1
 
nS

: (1.5)
With DV dened in Equation 1.5, we can rewrite the rm's Bellman equation as
follows:
Vt(n
S) = max
nJ
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
Z 1
z(nJ ;nS)
n
z

nJJ + nSS
 
wSnS + wJnJ

R
 
nS ; nJ
	
f (z) dz
+

F
 
z
 
nJ ; nS

DVt+1 (0)+ 
1  F  z  nJ ; nSDVt+1    nS + nJ
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
: (1.6)
Note that DVt+1 is relevant for the period t hiring decision of rms.
2. For each t, given DVt+1, we solve (1.6). Let n
J
t
 
nS

be the hiring policy function,
and ~Vt the updated value function. The policy function n
J
t
 
nS

allows us to
calculate the distribution of rms in the period t+ 1:
gt+1 (n) =
Z
nS
1


 
nS + nJt
 
nS

= n
	
gt
 
nS
  
1  F  z  nS dnS :
In order to update the discounted value function, we also need to calculate the
stochastic discount factor, hence output in the economy:
Ct = Yt =
Z
nS
Z 1
z(nJ ;nS)
z

nJhJt
 
nS

+ nSS

f (z) dzgt
 
nS

dnS
3. Based on the updated value function and the consumption level calculated in Step
2, update the sequence of discounted value functions
~DV t+1 =
u0 (Ct+1)
u0 (Ct)
~Vt+1
 
nS

:
4. Repeat Steps 1-3 using the updated discounted value functions.
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5. Repeat until the discounted value functions all converge
sup
1tT
sup
nS
jDVt   ~DV tj < tolerence:
1.6.3 Comparing Model Predictions to the Data
Using the parameters a and S calibrated in the last section, we compute the evolution
of output, the unemployment rate, and average labor productivity during the transition.
Figure 1.9: 1973 Recession: Output, Unemp. Rate, and Avg. Labor Prod.
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Figure 1.10: 1982 Recession: Output, Unemp. Rate, and Avg. Labor Prod.
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In Figure 1.9 and Figure 1.10, we compare the time series of output, the unemploy-
ment rate, and average labor productivity between our model and the data for older
recessions (the 1973 recession and the 1982 recession). Note that our model uses rela-
tively few parameters to match the data. We do not change any of the model parameters
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when matching the 1973 and 1982 recessions and so the model output is identical in
both cases.
For both recessions, our model does a reasonable job at approximating the rate of
recovery in output given that the only moment we target is the initial drop in output.
As for the pattern in unemployment, we can see from the middle panel of Figure 1.9
that the unemployment rate went down by 1:6% (from 9% to 7:4%) within the rst
year of recovery in the data. In our simulation, the unemployment rate goes down by
1:7%. From the middle panel of Figure 1.10, we see that following the 1982 recession,
the unemployment rate went down by 2:3% (from 10:8% to 8:5%) within the rst year
of recovery while in our simulation it goes down by 1:7%. Overall, we overestimate
the speed of recovery in the 1973 recession and underestimate the speed of recovery
in the 1982 recession which is as good as possible given that we are only using one
set of parameters for both recessions and no parameters are used to target this rate of
recovery.
From the right panel of Figure 1.9 and Figure 1.10, we see that following both the
1973 and 1982 recessions, average labor productivity dropped with output. Our model
delivers this procyclicality of labor productivity. The intuition for this is as follows. In
the 1973 and 1982 recessions, the dierence between the productivity levels of senior
and junior workers was relatively small. Therefore, start-up rms grew relatively fast.
This fast growth in employment results in rms spending little time on the productive
portion of the decreasing returns to scale technology. However, our model suggests that
average labor productivity in the economy was reduced following the recessions by the
lower productivity of junior workers.
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Figure 1.11: 2008 Recession: Output, Unemp. Rate, and Avg. Labor Prod.
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The only dierence in the parameterization between the older recessions and the
2008 recession which generates the model data is a change in S and the severity of the
shock to idiosyncratic productivity draws. Again the model does a fairly good job at
predicting the rate of recovery in output. In the unemployment path following the 2008
recession, the unemployment rate went down by 0:5% within the rst year of recovery
in the data. Our model predicts a 1:51% drop (middle panel of Figure 1.11). Our model
predicts a slower rate of recovery in unemployment as a result of the change in S=J and
though it only explains a portion of the reduction in the rate of unemployment recovery,
we are not using any parameters to target either the rise in unemployment or the rate
of recovery. Of course there are other eects such as nancial frictions and increased
specicity of labor which are discussed in the literature and are also contributing to the
reduction in the rate of unemployment recovery. These eects are outside the scope of
this paper.
In the 2008 recession, average labor productivity went up while output dropped.
Our model also delivers this counter cyclical pattern in labor productivity (right panel
of Figure 1.11). Intuitively, in 2008, the dierence between the productivity of senior
and junior workers is relatively large. Therefore, start-up rms grow slowly due to fear
of losing their senior workers upon bankruptcy. This slow growth in employment allows
rms to take advantage of the highly productive portion of the decreasing returns to
scale technology. Under our calibration, this eects dominates the counter eect due to
unproductive junior workers which tend to drag down labor productivity. As a result,
average labor productivity rises.
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1.7 Conclusion
In this paper we document two changes in the pattern of business cycles starting from
the 1990 recession. First, the speed of the recovery in unemployment rates has slowed
signicantly. Second, labor productivity has switched from being procyclical to coun-
tercyclical. We present a model which explains both facts through the variation of a
single parameter, namely the relative productivity of senior to junior workers.
In our model, when a recession occurs, many rms go bankrupt and need to start up
again. This causes two opposing forces on average labor productivity. First, start-up
rms employ a disproportionately large number of junior workers resulting in a decrease
of average labor productivity. Second, new rms are relatively small and produce on
a more productive portion of their decreasing returns to scale technology. These two
forces result in a non-linear relationship between the cyclicality of labor productivity
and the relative productivity of senior to junior workers.
In older recessions the dierence between the productivity of senior and junior work-
ers is low so that new rms tend to grow quickly. This causes an inux of junior workers
during periods immediately following a recession. The fast rate of growth for new rms
lessens the eects of producing on a more productive portion of the decreasing returns
to scale technology. In total, the downward forces on average labor productivity domi-
nates the upward force and results in the procyclicality of labor productivity observed
in older recessions.
As the productivity of senior relative to junior workers increases, rms become more
cautious (slower) in hiring in order to avoid losing their stock of senior workers upon
bankruptcy. This is because the stock of senior workers becomes more valuable to a
rm (and the resulting investment required to develop a junior worker into a senior
worker increases). This slow hiring results in rms spending more time on the relatively
productive portion of their decreasing returns to scale technology, and hence tends to
drive up average labor productivity. Additionally, the hiring is spread out over time
reducing the intensity of the downward eects on labor productivity of junior workers.
In this case, the upward force on average labor productivity dominates the downward
force and results in the countercyclicality of labor productivity observed in more recent
recessions.
Chapter 2
Public Law Enforcement: More Is
not Always Better
2.1 Introduction
Property rights, the ability of rms and consumers to own capital and other resources,
are essential to almost every economic model. However, for the most part these rights are
taken as given. A walk through the streets in an urban area of virtually any developing
country reveals that, in practice, this is not the case. Private security guards, metal
bars and large locks are commonplace to counteract theft. To date, the economic
literature on theft is primarily limited to the microeconomic arena even though it is an
important topic for policymakers. In this paper we incorporate theft, private security
and public law enforcement (PLE) in a general equilibrium framework with the goal of
understanding the eects of PLE on the incarceration rate, aggregate output and average
welfare. Our primary nding is that there exists a non-monotonic relation between the
level of PLE and all three of these aggregate variables. In particular, for countries
with relatively small levels of PLE, there is an inverse relationship between PLE and
both aggregate production and welfare primarily due to an increase in the incarceration
rate. However, for countries with higher levels of PLE, the level is positively related
to production and welfare and inversely related with the incarceration rate. We also
nd that private security exhibits a negative externality and is used as a substitute for
PLE, which results in an overuse of private security, particularly in economies with a
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low level of PLE.
The primary mechanism which is responsible for this result is relatively straightfor-
ward. For countries with low levels of PLE, very few criminals are actually caught. As
this level increases, so does the incarceration rate, which removes agents from the labor
force. Additionally, there is a general equilibrium eect which lowers the relative income
of the non-incarcerated agents through the increased burden of supporting those who
are incarcerated. This essentially decreases the deterrence of imprisonment and incents
additional agents to become thieves. As the level of PLE increases, the probability
of getting caught rises, which deters agents from stealing. At some point the increase
in the percent of thieves being caught is outweighed by the deterrence eect on the
quantity of individuals choosing to steal. At this point, the incarceration rate begins to
decrease in the level of PLE. This non monotonicity in the incarceration rate, which is
consistent with the data, is the primary driver behind the additional non monotonicities
in aggregate output and welfare. To quantify these eects using our benchmark model,
if the level of PLE in Guatemala increased to the level in Mexico, we would predict a
decrease in aggregate production of 0:33%. Again using our benchmark model, if the
level of PLE in Mexico improved to the level of that in the United States, we would
predict an increase in aggregate production of 2:58%.
For countries with a low level of PLE, we observe a high level of substitution between
PLE and expenditures on private security which dampens the eect PLE has on the
overall level of theft. Further, not only do these rms substitute private security for
PLE, we nd that economies with low levels of PLE tend to hire more private security
than is socially ecient. If we restrict rms such that they are only permitted to hire
a fraction of the private security that they would otherwise nd individually optimal,
aggregate production is higher than if rms were unrestricted in their private security
decisions. The reason for this is that by restricting how much rms can spend on private
security, rms end up hiring more workers which produce the nal good even though a
larger portion of what is produced is stolen.1
For high enough levels of PLE, we nd that marginal increases in the level of PLE
provide signicant gains to aggregate production and increase the labor force. As the
1In our model theft has a contemporaneous distortion on rms' optimal decision. For an analysis on
possible inter-period distortions that crime has on production see Arias, Iba~nez, and Zambrano (2014).
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probability of getting caught rises, agents are deterred from stealing and at some point
the drop in theft becomes larger than the increase in those thieves who are caught. The
reduction in incarceration rates augments the total labor force which increases total
production. Additionally, reduction in theft from rms lowers the distortionary wedge
between the marginal product of labor and the wage rate which raises both the eciency
and average size of rms. Finally, the increase in the wage rate and the reduction in the
burden of the incarcerated on the non-incarcerated increases the actual cost of getting
caught and puts further downward pressure on the theft rate.
When we extend our model to a dynamic setting, our results provide an explanation
for the large dierences we observe in PLE across countries. Since the marginal eects
of changes in PLE are very dierent depending on the current level of PLE, if there are
transition costs in modifying this level, countries with low current levels of PLE may
initially experience a reduction in welfare and production before seeing improvements in
response to increases in PLE. This implies that countries which are suciently impatient
would prefer to remain in a state of low PLE rather than face the transition path to a
high level of PLE.
Data which exists for private security consistently reveals that the correlation be-
tween private security expenditures and theft is positive. We match this fact. In our
model this relation is caused by PLE which both deters theft and serves as a substitute
for private security. In this sense, we make the same empirical observation as North
(1968) in that economies where rms have lower private security expenditures are also
economies with less theft and often higher production.
In order to direct and validate the way we model the decision of thieves in when
and how much to steal, and the way we model private security, we adopt two strategies.
First we incorporate existing ndings on theft in the psychology and sociology literature.
Second we allow agents to vary across two dimensions: in aversion to theft and in level
of ability as in the Lucas (1978) span of control model. Granting variation across these
dimensions gives insight into micro decisions of agents and across rms. We validate
our modeling of theft and private security by matching these patterns to the data.
Heterogenous modeling of agents also gives further insights. Specically, agents
with lower ability earn less which decreases their cost of being caught and increases the
likelihood they engage in theft. Second, the distortion from theft across rms is not
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uniform. Firms managed by entrepreneurs with higher ability aord larger amounts of
private security which reduces the wedge between the marginal productivity of labor and
the wage rate. This mechanism causes the dispersion across rm size to be increasing
in the rate of theft.
As far as we are aware, we present the rst general equilibrium model incorporating
theft, private security and PLE. However, our work contributes and builds upon a vast
theoretical and empirical literature.
Our paper continues in the spirit of the seminal work by Becker (1968). In our
model consumers analyze the costs and benets of committing a crime and make a
rational decision of whether to engage in criminal activity. Perhaps the model most
similar to ours is the one in Fender (1999) which includes many of the same elements
and some of the same results. In that model, corruptible agents choose between work
and theft and there is consideration of the level of enforcement which is very similar to
our notion of PLE. In line with this paper, we observe similar relationships between the
level of enforcement, the number of criminals and the number punished. In contrast to
Fender (1999) and Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2003), our model allows thieves to both
work and steal, we include a notion of rms, agents are heterogenous in ability and we
incorporate general equilibrium eects. This allows us to match micro data in order to
validate our macro results.
Our ndings are consistent with the ndings in the empirical paper by Buonanno,
Drago, Galbiati, and Zanella (2011) and Iba~nez, Rodrguez, and Zarruk (2013). Their
work suggests that increases in the incarceration rate deters crime. In our model we
support that this eect holds, but the general equilibrium eects can cause pressure on
crime (specically theft) in both directions. Due to the current absence of dynamics in
our model, we are unable to address the (largely empirical) literature on the deterrents
of the eects of prison on recidivism.2
Our paper is also related to the existing literature relating trust, extortion, distortion
and rm size. We observe a similar pattern in distribution of rm size due to increases
in theft as Ranasinghe (2012) observes from increases in extortion in the sense that
higher levels increase dispersion of rm size. Our eects dier slightly in that all rms
are smaller than they would be in the absence of theft but the distortion is greatest for
2See Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova (2009) for an example.
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the smallest rms. Finally, consistent with Grobovsek (2014), we nd that increased
levels of theft among workers constrains rm size.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents an empirical
motivation for our model and the main mechanism in it. Section 2.3 outlines the model.
Section 2.4 presents the primary results. Section 2.5 considers the model in a dynamic
setting. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Data and Empirical Motivation
We rst use data to validate the main mechanism in our model; namely, the non-
monotonic relationship between the incarceration rate and the level of public law en-
forcement. For this, we make use of the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI). The WGI are six governance indicators based on the views and experiences of
citizens from over 200 countries compiled using 32 dierent data sources. In general
the sources are of four dierent types: Surveys on households and rms; commercial
business information providers; non-government organizations; and public sector orga-
nizations. The WGI are the result of rescaling such sources using a components model,
in order to get indicators for each of the countries considered.3 We use the percentile
ranking of the Rule of Law Index from these indicators to proxy for the level of public
law enforcement, since it is the indicator that is most consistent with our notion of PLE
in the model.4
Additionally, we rely on incarceration rates compiled by the International Centre for
Prison Studies in their World Prison Brief (WPB). The WPB provides data collected
from national sources on information about prison systems from over 200 countries.
We dene the incarceration rate of a country as the prison population per 100,000
inhabitants in a given country.
We rst construct an unbalanced panel using the Rule of Law index, RoL, and the
incarceration rate, IR, for 202 countries. Data for Rule of Law is available biennually
3See Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010) for a description of the methodology used to calculate
these indicators.
4According to the World Bank denition, \The Rule of Law index captures perceptions of the extent
to which agents have condence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and
violence".
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for most countries starting in 1996 and is available annually from 2002. Availability of
incarceration rates, on the other hand, is not homogeneous across countries. We have
two to seven observations for each country with a median of six. We estimate the model
specied in (2.1).
IRi;t = i + 1RoLi;t + 2RoL
2
i;t + "i;t; (2.1)
where i denotes a country xed eect. We nd a signicant non-monotonic relation-
ship between Rule of Law and incarceration rate. In fact, the estimated coecients
imply that there is a hump in the relationship between these two variables: Around
the 60-th percentile, further increases in Rule of Law are related with decreases in the
incarceration rate. The estimation results are shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Incarceration as a function of Rule of Law
Dependant variable is Incarceration Rate
Rule of Law 2:108
(0.575)
Rule of Law2  0:0171
(0.006)
Observations 789
R-squared 0:931
Country xed-eects
***: Signicant at 1%.
Source: World Bank and International Center for Prison Studies. Authors' calculations.
In order to obtain a better understanding of this relationship we look at two particu-
lar countries: Colombia and Estonia. We observe that the Rule of Law for both countries
improved from 1998 to 2010. However, incarceration rates increased in Colombia, while
they decreased in Estonia. A main dierence between the two countries was that the
Rule of Law in Colombia was relatively low in 1998, while for Estonia it was high. This
behavior of incarceration rates is consistent with the predictions of our model.
Colombia had suered from a civil conict since the 1960's, but the conict got worse
during the 1990's. In 1998 Colombia had a Rule of Law index of 24.4. One year later
Colombia began receiving military aid from the U.S. with the aim of ending the civil
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conict.5 By 2010, the Rule of Law index in Colombia reached 44.5. In the same lapse
of time its incarceration rate went from 114 to 181. On the other hand, Estonia had
a Rule of Law index of 67.5 in 1998. In 2002 the EU summit in Copenhagen formally
invited Estonia to join the EU and a year later Estonians voted to join. In 2010 the
Rule of Law index had grown to 83.9. Meanwhile the incarceration rate decreased from
342 in 1998 to 266 in 2010. These two examples are consistent with the patterns we
observe more broadly across countries. Namely that incarceration rates are upside down
U-shaped in relation to the Rule of Law index.
We now analyze the relationship between Rule of Law and incarceration rates across
countries. We use the 2010 Rule of Law and the most recent information available on
WGI for the incarceration rate. We also observe a hump-shaped relationship between
Rule of Law and incarceration rates in this case, which suggests that the relationship
holds both across countries and time. For low levels of public law enforcement, we
observe that increases in this level are accompanied by an increase in the incarceration
rate. However, once the level of public law enforcement reaches a certain point, further
increases are actually related to lower incarceration rates. Table 2.2 shows both a
linear and quadratic t when regressing the incarceration rate on the Rule of Law. We
observe that incarceration rates appear to be increasing in the Rule of Law, although
after including country controls, this relationship largely disappears. When we add a
quadratic Rule of Law term, the coecient on the rst term becomes much larger and
increases in signicance. Additionally the goodness of t is signicantly improved. Both
of these support the use of a quadratic term and that the hump shape in incarceration
rates is a better t for the data.
5According to a report from the U.S. Government Accountability Oce, as of 2008, U.S. State and
Defense departments had provided nearly $5 billion to Colombian military and National Police.
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Table 2.2: Incarceration as a function of Rule of Law
Dependant variable is Incarceration Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 106:9 956:3  133:2 657
(24.77) (173.9) (62.02) (205.1)
Rule of Law 1:294  0:435 11:71 6:950
(0.454) (0.773) (2.523) (2.909)
Rule of Law2  0:097  0:074
(0.023) (0.028)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 209 157 209 157
R-squared 0:038 0:241 0:113 0:274
For incarceration rate we use the most recent information available on www.prisonstudies.org
Rule of Law refers to the Rule of Law index of 2010.
Controls include GDP, mortality rates of children under 5, and life expectancy at birth all 2011
OLS estimation. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
**: Signicant at 5%, ***: Signicant at 1%.
Source: World Bank and International Center for Prison Studies. Authors' calculations.
In addition to our macro data, we turn to the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to
provide us with micro evidence to support our modeling of theft and private security.
The surveys are conducted at the rm level using a representative sample of an econ-
omy's private sector. The World Bank selected rms for the Enterprise Surveys using
stratied random sampling. All members of the population have the same probabil-
ity of being sampled and no weighting of the observations is necessary. However, only
rms with 5 or more employees are targeted for an interview and organizations with
100% government ownership are ineligible to participate.6 Surveys occur face-to-face
with business owners and top managers. These surveys have been conducted every year
from 2006 to 2011. Nonetheless, in any single country there have been a maximum of
two surveys and the vast majority of countries have been surveyed a single time. The
nal dataset used in this paper includes 130 country-years and averages 373 rms inter-
viewed per country-year combination for a total of 48,436 observations. There are 111
6The sample targets rms they believe to have 5 or more employees, however some rms are observed
to have less than 5 upon conducting the interview.
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unique countries where surveys have been conducted. Questions are both qualitative
and quantitative in nature. Qualitative questions ask perception of certain business
obstacles (e.g. \Do you perceive crime, theft and disorder as a major constraint?").
Quantitative questions of particular relevance request the number of employees, the an-
nual revenue, the amount of annual losses due to theft as well as annual private security
expenditures.
Summary statistics are included in Table 2.3. Theft is identied as a \major"
constraint by over a quarter of all rms interviewed. Additionally, even though only
roughly a quarter of rms directly experienced theft in the year of interview, almost
two thirds of rms have positive expenditures on private security. The average security
expenditures for rms purchasing private security was 2:6% of total revenues. Firms
which experienced theft had an average loss equivalent to 3:8% of their total revenues.7
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics
Share of rms that perceive theft as a major constraint 27.8%
Share of rms that had positive expenditures on private security 63.9%
Average private security expenditures* $59,931
Average private security expenditures over revenue** 2.6%
Firms that experienced theft 24.7%
Average level of theft* $18,786
Average theft over revenue*** 3.8%
*: Levels were converted to 2000 US dollars.
**: Conditional on having positive private security expenditures.
***: Conditional on having experienced theft.
Source: The World Bank (2012). Authors' calculations.
We now make a number of motivating observations where we highlight how the
level of public law enforcement is important in determining theft and private security
choices in equilibrium. Figure 2.1 shows average experienced theft to average private
security expenditures at the country level. We observe that average theft is positively
correlated with average private security expenditures and the relationship is signicant
at the 1% level. We assume that all else constant, theft should decrease in security
7While theft accounts for 2:6% of total revenues, this translates to a larger portion of total prots
and therefore a larger portion of GDP
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expenditures. However, both theft and security decisions are endogenous to the envi-
ronment. Therefore the observed positive correlation is not causal but is indicative of
some tertiary eect. We posit that one of the key drivers of this relationship is public
law enforcement. First, as seen in Figure 2.2a, security is decreasing in the country's
Rule of Law index which we use as a proxy for public law enforcement. Second, theft
is also decreasing in public law enforcement as seen in Figure 2.2b. This additional
information seems to support private security being an imperfect substitute for public
law enforcement and that a rm's equilibrium private security decision does not fully
compensate for the lack of a strong public law enforcement presence.
Figure 2.1: Theft over Revenue vs Security Expenditures over Revenue
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Figure 2.2: Security Expenditures over Revenue and Theft over Revenue vs Rule of
Law
(a) Sec to Rev vs Rule of Law
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(b) Theft to Rev vs Rule of Law
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Our nal motivating observation is that we observe average rm size to be inversely
correlated with average theft, and this relation is also signicant at the 1% level. Figure
2.3 shows this relation. A similar observation was made by Grobovsek (2014).
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Figure 2.3: Average Size of Firm vs Average Theft over Revenue
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To conclude, we nd that incarceration is non-monotonic in the Rule of Law. In
particular, it is upside down U-shaped, and this relationship holds both across time and
across countries. At the micro-level we nd suggestive evidence that the level of public
law enforcement is important in the determination of equilibrium theft and private
security choices.
2.3 Environment
Our model is constructed in the spirit of Lucas (1978). Each consumer makes two
choices: whether to become a thief or not, and whether to become an entrepreneur or a
worker. Consider a particular consumer. If she chooses to become a thief, she optimally
chooses how much to steal from rms, taking as given how much security is hired by
each rm. However, she faces an exogenous probability of getting caught and losing
what she stole as well as the ability to work or manage a rm. If the consumer decides
to become an entrepreneur, she takes into account how much theft she faces and chooses
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how much security to hire, in addition to choosing the optimal size of her rm. If she
becomes a worker, then she works in rms in exchange for a wage.
2.3.1 Consumers
In this economy there is a unit mass continuum of risk neutral consumers, each endowed
with a skill level and an aversion to stealing. Consider a consumer with skill level z and
aversion to stealing parameter . She maximizes her utility, given by (2.2).
u(z; ) = max fuT (z; ); uNT (z)g ; (2.2)
where
uT (z; ) = (1  ) [max fw; (z)g+T  ] + c  
uNT (z) = max fw; (z)g  :
That is, she decides whether to become a thief and get utility uT (z; ) or not become a
thief and get uNT (z). In the former case, the consumer steals from rms to get an extra
income of T . She gets away with stealing with an exogenous probability 1  . With
probability  the consumer gets caught and loses all sources of income. Instead she
receives consumption c. We interpret  2 [0; 1] as the level of public law enforcement
and we interpret a thief being caught as implying that she goes to jail. In this way, if
a consumer is caught, she neither works nor becomes an entrepreneur. Finally,  is a
lump sum tax applied to consumers that do not go to jail which nances c for those in
jail. That is,
 =
cMT
1  MT ; (2.3)
where MT denotes the mass of consumers who become thieves.
Regardless of the decision to become a thief, the consumer also decides whether to
work for a wage w or become an entrepreneur and receive the prots (z) from the rm
she manages. If she becomes an entrepreneur her income will depend on her skill z. If
the consumer decides not to become a thief, she receives the income either from working
or from being an entrepreneur, minus the lump sum tax.
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We assume that  and z are drawn from independent distributions. We will denote
by F () and G() the cumulative distribution functions of  and z, respectively. A
consumer's decision is characterized by z and , so we will denote each agent by the
realizations of these random variables.
2.3.2 Firms, theft and private security
Consider an entrepreneur with skill level z. She maximizes the prots from the rm
she manages, which we will denote as rm z, by hiring workers ly. The rms produce
using a decreasing returns to scale function, zly , where  2 (0; 1). From what rm z
produces, (1   )MT  gets stolen, where MT denotes the measure of consumers that
become thieves and  is how much each thief decides to steal from rm z.8 Finally, rm
z hires ls security guards to diminish theft. All rms produce the same nal good and
we normalize the price of this good to 1. To summarize, rm z solves problem (2.4).
(z)  max
ly0;ls0
zly   wly   wls   (1  )MT (z): (2.4)
In order to determine how many security guards are hired, we assume rm z under-
stands the thieves' problem. Agents that choose to steal attempt to steal some amount
from all rms and choose an optimal theft intensity from each rm. Consider the prob-
lem of a consumer that becomes a thief and decides to steal from rm z. The income
derived in stealing from rm z is given by
T (z)  max
0
   C (z); (2.5)
where C (z) denotes the cost born by those who steal from rm z. We make three
assumptions regarding this cost. First, C (z) is increasing and convex in the amount
stolen. The more that is stolen, the greater the transportation costs, storage costs,
etc. Additionally, without convexity, thieves would always attempt to steal everything
possible or steal nothing at all which does not hold true empirically. Moreover, the
thieves' problem does not solely consider the nancial costs but also the utility costs of
time and anguish involved in planning and carrying out an operation. It is reasonable
8Since agents are risk neutral, we are able to abstract from which rms are stolen from and only care
about the expected level of theft.
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that the cost of theft in terms of planning, stress, and time grows exponentially from
stealing a pack of gum to stealing everything in a store.
Our second assumption is that security aects the choice of theft by making it more
costly to steal. The presence of a security guard in the rm causes more planning and
time in order to be able to steal. This is consistent with what is found by Kraut (1976)
where the risk associated with stealing is perceived as a deterrent.
Finally, we assume that the cost of stealing is decreasing in the amount produced
by the rm. This accounts for the fact that if a rm is bigger, then there are more
things to steal, and so stealing the same amount as from a smaller rm is easier. This
is consistent with the results reported by Smigel (1956), who nds that people are more
likely to steal from big rms than from small rms.
We assume that C (z)  (ls(z))ly(z) 
2
2 , where  (ls) 


1  ls
 1 

denotes the amount
of provided by hiring ls guards for a given level of MT and is strictly increasing and
concave in ls. The solution to (2.5) is
(z) =
ly(z)
 (ls(z))
: (2.6)
Then T (z) =
1
2(z) and the aggregate income received from stealing T is given
by
T 
Z
(z;)2E
T (z)dF ()dG(z)  
Z
(z;)2ETT T (z)dF ()dG(z); (2.7)
where E and T denote the set of consumers that become entrepreneurs and the set of
consumers that become thieves, respectively. That is,
E  f(z; ) : (z)  wg (2.8)
T  f(z; ) : uT (z; ) > uNT (z)g : (2.9)
We abuse notation and also refer to E as the set of z for which consumers become
entrepreneurs. The specic use of E will be clear from context.
The second term in (2.7) is due to the fact that thieves do not get income when
stealing from the rms managed by entrepreneurs that are thieves and get caught.
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Recall that a fraction  of the total entrepreneurs that become thieves go to jail and
are unable to manage rms.
2.3.3 Micro Support for Modeling Theft and Private Security
We use the existing literature as well as qualitative patterns in micro-data to motivate
our modeling methods. Specically we make four observations using data from the
Enterprise Surveys (See Table 2.4). First, both the absolute level of theft and private
security expenditures are increasing across rm size. This is consistent with Smigel
(1956).
Table 2.4: Results in Theft and Security Across Firms
Dependent Variable: Theft TheftRevenue Security
Security
Revenue
Security
Revenue
Security>0
Revenue
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size (Labor) 224:14 613:99
(12:45) (42:86)
Size (log Labor)  0:002 0:001 0:004  0:003
(0:000) (0:000) (0:001) (0:000)
Size (log Labor2)  0:000
(0:000)
Observations 48; 299 48,299 48; 299 48; 299 48; 299 30; 838
Country-Year Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
OLS estimation. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
***: Signicant at 1%. **: Signicant at 5%. *: Signicant at 10%.
Next we analyze these same variables as a share of revenue. While theft is increasing
in the size of rm, theft as a percentage of revenue is decreasing in the size of rm.
The relation with private security expenditures is slightly more complicated. When we
regress private security expenditures as a share of revenues we nd that the share is
increasing slowly in the size of rm. However, when we add a quadratic term on size
to the regression we nd a hump shape, with private security share increasing for small
rms and decreasing for larger rms. Another level of analysis reveals the cause for
this hump. The probability that a rm purchases private security is increasing in size.
However, given a rm purchases private security (column 6 of Table 2.4), the share of
revenue spent on private security is decreasing in the size of rm.
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These micro patterns were used to guide our modeling of private security and theft.
To the extent possible, given the level of heterogeneity used in our model, we match
these patterns for a large range of . Figure 2.4 matches qualitatively the results we
report in Table 2.4. In particular, Figure 2.4d matches the data in column 6 of Table
2.4. Due to the level of heterogeneity it is not within the scope of our model to exactly
match the hump shape found in the data.
Figure 2.4: Matching Micro Patterns
(a) Theft vs Size
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2.3.4 Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this economy is allocations f(z); ly(z); ls(z)gz2E , wages w, and sets
E and T such that
1. (z) satises (2.6) for all z 2 E; and ly(z) and ls(z) solve (2.10);
2. E and T satisfy (2.8) and (2.9);
3. the labor market clears:Z
(z;)2E
(ly(z) + ls(z)) dF ()dG(z) 
Z
(z;)2ETT (ly(z) + ls(z)) dF ()dG(z)
=
Z
(z;)2Ec
dF ()dG(z) 
Z
(z;)2EcTT dF ()dG(z);
4. and the good market clears:
Y 
Z
(z;)2E
zly(z)
dF ()dG(z)  
Z
(z;)2ETT zly(z)dF ()dG(z)
=
Z
(z;)2E
[w (ly(z) + ls(z)) + (z) + (1  )(z)MT ] dF ()dG(z)
 
Z
(z;)2ETT [w (ly(z) + ls(z)) + (z) + (1  )(z)MT ] dF ()dG(z);
where
MT 
Z
(z;)2T
dF ()dG(z):
2.3.5 Characterization of the equilibrium
Lemma 1 characterizes E and T in terms of equilibrium prices and consumer choices.
Lemma 1.
E =

(z; ) : z  zE	
T =

(z; ) : z < zE and  < W
	[
(z; ) : z  zE and  < E(z)	 ;
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where zE is the unique value of z such that (zE) = w and
W  c
1  MT + (1  )T   w
E(z)  c
1  MT + (1  )T   (z):
Proof. See B.1.1.
From Lemma 1 we see that thieves are those agents who have the lowest levels of
skill and the lowest aversion to stealing. Since income is increasing in skill, we also
observe that those with the smallest incomes are the most likely to become thieves. We
note that these results are consistent with both the theoretical and empirical existing
literature.9 Figure 2.5 shows E and T across skill (x-axis) and aversion to stealing
(y-axis).
Figure 2.5: E and T across Skill and Aversion to Stealing
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As mentioned, rm z knows (2.6). Therefore the rm's problem can be written as
9For example see Freeman (1999).
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stated in (2.10).
(z) = max
ly0;ls0
zly  

(1  )MT
 (ls)
+ w

ly   wls: (2.10)
Lemma 2 characterizes the demand for labor and security given wages w, as well as
rm's prots and how much is stolen from each rm.
Lemma 2. Assume  > 0:5. Then
ly(z) =

z
w
 

(1  )MT
w
 11 
ls(z) =
1  


(1  )MT
w
z
w
 

(1  )MT
w
 1 
(z) =
1  

w

z
w
 

(1  )MT
w
 11 
(z) =

w
(1  )MT
1 z
w
 

(1  )MT
w
 1 
:
Proof. See B.1.2.
Now, notice from (2.10) that the production function satises Inada conditions, so
ly(z) > 0 for every rm. We assume that  > 0:5 so that () is strictly concave and rst
order conditions with respect to ls are also sucient. Using the fact that the solution
is always interior, taking rst order conditions of (2.10) with respect to ly yields
w +
(1  )MT
 (ls(z))
= zl 1y : (2.11)
In the absence of theft (i.e. MT = 0) (2.11) reduces to w = zl
 1
y , or ly =
 
z
w
 1
1  .
We observe that theft creates a wedge which causes the marginal productivity of labor
to be greater than w by a factor of (1 )MT(ls(z)) . Observe that the wedge is increasing in
the measure of thieves and decreasing in both a higher level of public law enforcement
and private security. As a consequence of theft, rms are smaller in equilibrium than
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in the absence of theft:
z
w
 

(1  )MT
w
 11 
<
z
w
 1
1 
:
Corollary 1 shows that the ratio of theft experienced by a rm to private security
expenditures is constant and greater than 1.
Corollary 1. The ratio of theft experienced by a rm, (1   )MT (z), and private
security expenditures, wls(z), is constant and equal to

1  .
Proposition 1 shows that in equilibrium every rm nds it optimal to hire security.
Proposition 1. Assume  > 0:5. Then ls(z) > 0 for all z  zE.
Proof. By denition zE is such that (zE) = w. From the expression for (z) in Lemma
(2),
zE =
w1 

((1  )MT ) +

1
1  
1  1


w
and ls(z) > 0 if and only if z >
w1 
 ((1  )MT ). Since zE > w
1 
 ((1  )MT ),
the result follows.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Parameterization
Our current parametrization is chosen such that reasonable parameter values are able
to give results which qualitatively match the micro and macro patterns we observe in
the data. Table 2.5 shows the values of the parameters that we use and the moments
we target.
We calibrate preference and technology parameters to match key aspects of the
US economy. Our model economy consists of eight parameters. In accordance with
Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011), we assume that entrepreneurial ability follows a Pareto
distribution with shape parameter  and scale parameter z. Since Buera, Kaboski, and
Shin (2011) also t their model to the US economy, we adopt  = 4:84 from their paper.
We set the nominal Pareto scale parameter z at 1 for simplicity. The distribution for
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preference on theft is assumed to be uniformly distributed and is characterized by 
and . We calibrate these parameters to fall within a reasonable range given annual
reported property crimes and the percentage of US citizens with a criminal record.10
We calibrate c, public expenditure on the incarcerated, by matching the costs per
prisoner relative to average income.11 Parameter  is the returns to scale of the pro-
duction function. We choose  to target an eective return to scale  of 0:85, which is
commonly used in the literature.12
Finally, we choose , the level of public law enforcement, and the extra degree of
freedom we have from the distribution function on  to match inventory shrinkage and
loss prevention expenditures as a percentage of revenue from retail rms, as reported
by the 2011 National Retail Security Survey.
Table 2.5: Calibration - Parametrization
Moment Data Model Parameter
Consumption Expenditure per Criminal 0.37 0:37 c = 0:36
Loss Prevention Expenditures 0.35% 0:35%  = 0:82
Criminal Record 3.1%-27.8% 5:00%  = 4:00
Inventory Shrinkage 1.42% 1:42%  =  0:69
Returns to Scale 0.85 0:80  = 0:80
Pareto Shape Parameter 4.84 4:84  = 4:84
2.4.2 Macro Results
The primary result of our paper is that changes to the level of public law enforcement
have dierent eects depending on the current level of public law enforcement. In Figure
2.6 we observe that for low levels of public law enforcement, increases to this level can
actually decrease the amount of total production. Small increases in the level of public
law enforcement cause a decrease in GDP for those countries with low levels of public
law enforcement. Countries with higher levels of public law enforcement demonstrate a
10The National Employment Law Project estimates that 27.8% of US adults have a criminal record.
On the other hand the FBIs UCR Program reports a property crime rate of 3.1% in 2009.
11According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, as cited in the report \Public Safety, Public Spending"
prepared by the Public Safety Performance Project, the marginal cost per prisoner was $13,797 in 2005.
On the other hand the Social Security Administration reports an Average Wage Index in 2005 of $36,953.
We choose c so that c
w
= $13;797
$36;953
= :37.
12See Khan and Thomas (2013) or Ranasinghe (2012) for other papers using a similar number.
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positive correlation between per capita GDP and the level of public law enforcement.
Finally, we note that the eect of public law enforcement on aggregate production can
be as large as 6:02%.
Figure 2.6: Total Production vs Public LE
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We explain the primary mechanism for this result with Figure 2.7a. Recall from
Table 2.2 the non-monotonicity in the incarceration rate. Our model produces the same
pattern as we vary the level of public law enforcement holding all other parameters
from the benchmark model xed. These result can be explained rather intuitively. If
we think of the incarceration rate as a rectangle with the vertical axis representing the
level of public law enforcement , which in our model also represents the percentage
of thieves who are caught, and the horizontal axis as the measure of people who steal
MT , then the incarceration rate is simply the area of this rectangle. In the benchmark
model we observe that @MT@ < 0. At some point the decrease in the measure of thieves
outweighs the increase in the percentage of thieves who are caught. This concept is
visually represented in Figure 2.7b.13
13While the levels shown in this gure are quite large relative to incarceration rates observed in
the United States, the idea is that increasing public law enforcement causes workers to be removed (or
possibly misallocated) from the labor force. Multiple studies have been conducted to review the measure
of people in the United States who have a criminal record. This number consistently comes out between
one-quarter and one-third of the population. A recent survey from the Society of Human Resources
Management shows that 92% of their members perform criminal background checks on some or all job
candidates (The Society of Human Resources Management is the largest association of human resources
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Figure 2.7: Incarceration
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In Figure 2.8a we calculate the equilibrium average theft and average private security
expenditures across economies that only dier in their level of public law enforcement
(). We observe a positive correlation between these two measures.14 Figure 2.8b
splits production into four categories, two of which are security and theft. The security
line represents the total cost in nal good paid to private security workers. The theft
line represents the total value of goods stolen. When we look at these two variables
across the level of public law enforcement we see that they match Figures 2.2a and 2.2b.
While private security expenditures directly reduce theft, in equilibrium rms hire more
private security and more agents choose to engage in theft when there is less public law
enforcement. In this sense, public law enforcement directly reduces theft, but it also
crowds out private security expenditures, which indirectly puts an upward pressure on
theft. If policymakers fail to consider this indirect eect, they are likely to overestimate
the benets from public law enforcement.
personnel. The survey can be found in Background Checking: Conducting Criminal Background Checks
(Jan. 22, 2010)). A number of articles, including 65 Million \Need Not Apply", put out by the National
Employment Law Project, argue that having a criminal background can severely limit job opportunity.
While our model is binary in whether an agent is able to work or not, we believe that the actual eect
of public law enforcement observed in our model is consistent with what is observed in data.
14In our model both measures are perfectly correlated, as proven in the Corollary to Lemma 2.
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Figure 2.8: Macro Results
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2.4.3 Implications on Welfare
Turning to welfare, we observe a similar pattern to that of production relative to the
level of public law enforcement. For smaller levels of public law enforcement, increases
in the level actually reduce total welfare as seen in Figure 2.9a. Nonetheless, the range
of values for which welfare is decreasing is smaller than for production.
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Figure 2.9: Eects on Welfare
(a) Welfare
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Explaining in detail this result requires analyzing the expression for welfare. Equa-
tion (2.12) shows that welfare is given by the production of the economy minus the cost
incurred by thieves when stealing, CT , and the aversion to steal, . These two extra
terms explain why welfare and production are not the same.
U 
Z
(z;)
u(z; )dF ()dG(z) = Y   CT  ; (2.12)
where
CT  (1  )MT
Z
zzE
(1  F (E(z)))a (ls(z) jMT )
zly(z)T
(z)2
2
dG(z)
 
 Z
z<zE
Z W

+
Z
zzE
Z E(z)

!
dF ()dG(z):
Next, we analyze the eect of theft on welfare by calculating the extra consumption
that consumers in our model require in order to be indierent to an economy without
theft. The economy without theft that we consider is characterized in (B.5) of B.2.
Since welfare includes non-pecuniary costs in utility due to theft and aversion to
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steal, we analyze how much production needs to increase both including and excluding
CT and . That is, let Y
NT denote an economy where there is no theft. The solid
line in Figure 2.9b shows Y
NT+CT+
Y   1 and the dotted line shows Y
NT
Y   1. From
this gure we can conclude that the eect of theft on welfare is considerable. For some
values of  consumption has to increase by over 7% in order to have the same utility
as in an economy without theft. Notice that considering both the costs of theft and
the aversion to stealing lowers the amount by which consumption has to be increased
for most values of  since the parametrization shown in Section 2.4.1 implies that it
is mostly consumers with negative values of  who become thieves in equilibrium (i.e.
those who get positive utility from the act of stealing.)
2.4.4 Negative Externality of Private Security
We now calculate the negative externality that is caused by hiring private security.
For this, we consider an alternative equilibrium where rms are not allowed to hire as
much private security as they nd optimal. That is, let l(z) be the optimal private
security hired by rm z; i.e. the value of ls that is a solution to (2.10). We consider an
equilibrium where rm z can only hire bls(z)  Sec  l(z), for Sec 2 (0; 1); that is, an
equilibrium where rms can only hire a fraction of the security that they nd optimal.
We keep all parameters of the model as in Table 2.5.
Figure 2.10: Production as a function of 
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Figure 2.10 contrasts the production in equilibrium for Sec = 1 (i.e. the benchmark
equilibrium) and for Sec = 0:5 (an equilibrium where rms can only hire half as much
security as they otherwise nd optimal). For low values of , restricting private security
can increase production up to 1.5%. Private security helps diminish the wedge caused
by theft, as seen in (2.11). Nonetheless, when Sec = 1, workers that could be hired to
produce are hired as private security guards. When  is low, private security causes a
negative externality: workers that are hired as security guards could be hired to produce
the nal good. Since lower  implies a higher percentage of revenue spent on security
(see Figure 2.8a), the eect of reducing security is much higher for lower .
2.4.5 Sensitivity Analysis
We conduct a sensitivity analysis on the remaining variables to better understand how
they aect the model. An important parameter in our model is c. This parameter
represents the consumption level received by agents who engage in theft and are caught.
As c increases, the possibility of getting caught becomes less of a deterrent. Additionally,
the burden borne by those who are not caught increases, reducing the value of not
engaging in theft and adding incentives towards becoming a thief. As c increases,
production, the average size of rms and utility all monotonically decrease, andMT , the
measure of people who become thieves, monotonically increases in c. The implication is
that, if you do not care strongly about very negative outcomes for those who are caught
stealing, the best policy is to implement very harsh penalties. A potential reason to
avoid harsh penalties is concern for the innocent and the costly as well as potentially
inaccurate verication of guilt. This is currently outside the scope of this model.
The distribution of  represents the distribution of the moral bre of the agents
in our model. Apart from matching moments in data, it is dicult to know a proper
strategy for determining what this distribution should look like. However, we are able
to see how changing the distribution aects the results. Conceptually there are two
important components of the distribution of  which aect theft in our model. First,
the measure of people who steal is determined by the measure of people below the
cutos W or E(z) in the distribution of .15 Second, the sensitivity of the model to
changes in various other parameters depends on the density of the distribution over 
15See Lemma 1 for a characterization of these cutos.
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at the aforementioned cutos.
We make the following observations. First, the model is more sensitive to changes
in  than to changes in . This is because changes in  directly aect the measure of
people who prefer to steal whereas changes in  aect the density of people in the range
of those who prefer to steal. Lowering  increases the density of people in the range
of those who prefer to steal and vice versa. Second, for the most part the eects of
the distribution of  on equilibrium moments are rather intuitive. The only unusual
result is that total welfare is not monotonic in , but this is easily explained. In all real
measures, lowering  makes the economy worse o; however, recall that  is the measure
of aversion to theft which factors directly into utility. Negative 's can be interpreted as
a rush or pleasure from stealing. As we increase the pleasure from stealing two things
happen: The measure of people who steal increases and the extra utility those agents
receive from stealing increases. If we make the aversion to theft negative enough, the
overall utility can actually begin to decrease in .
2.4.6 Extensions
We now consider two extensions to the model: First we consider a model where theft
causes a destruction of goods. That is, for every unit of good that is stolen, only a
fraction  can be consumed by thieves. In particular we replace thieves' problem (2.5)
by (2.13).
T (z)  max
0
   C (z): (2.13)
Our benchmark model is given by  = 1 and we consider economies where we change
the value of . Values such that  < 1 might act as a deterrent for thieves, since their
return for stealing is decreased. However, it might also be the case that they might
attempt to steal even more in order to achieve the same consumption as they would
otherwise get when  = 1. In equilibrium we observe that for low levels of  it is the
rst eect that dominates. For intermediate levels of , it depends on the level of public
law enforcement: In economies with low  theft increases, reducing total production in
equilibrium.
In general,  < 1 causes production to be less sensitive to the level of public law
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enforcement. Moreover, for low values of  production is higher across all levels of public
law enforcement, relative to the case when  = 1. See Figure 2.11a.
Figure 2.11: Production for various levels of  and A
(a) Production for dierent values of 
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We also consider a model where theft causes labor to be less productive. We can
rationalize this by assuming that entrepreneurs know that their employees might be
stealing from the rm they are working at, or by assuming that employees who steal
work less time, since they devote some time on their job to stealing. We model this
feature by replacing (2.4) with (2.14).
(z)  max
ly0;ls0
z ((1 AMT )ly)   wly   wls   (1  )MT (z); (2.14)
for A 2 [0; 1]. Our benchmark model is given by A = 0 and in this section we consider
economies where A > 0. The fact that workers are less productive when there is theft
causes production to be lower when A > 0 than in our benchmark model for all levels
of public law enforcement (See Figure 2.11b). Additionally, production becomes more
sensitive to the level of . In particular, for lower levels of public law enforcement, an
increase in the level causes higher labor productivity. For values of A that are high
enough, this increment in labor productivity counteracts the removal of agents from
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the labor force, thus making production increasing in  for all levels of . In summary,
we nd that while these extensions oer quantitive dierences they do not aect our
primary qualitative results.
2.5 Extending to a Dynamic Framework
In this section, we extend our static model to a dynamic framework in order to theoret-
ically provide a rationalization for why certain countries persist in a state of low public
law enforcement while other countries choose high levels of public law enforcement. To
accomplish this we endogenize the level of public law enforcement, , by allowing a
benevolent government to choose an optimal level of enforcement in each period. In or-
der to simplify the problem, we take our ndings from the static model and characterize
the policy functions of consumers and rms as reduced form functions of .
2.5.1 Dynamic Model
Time is discrete and innite. There is a unit measure of agents which each produce z
units of output per period. MJ represents the fraction of agents currently incarcerated.
These agents are unable to produce or steal. Total production each period prior to theft
is given by z(1 MJ). MT continues to represent the measure of agents which choose to
attempt theft. The total amount stolen is given by a parameter  times the proportion
choosing to steal. In total, a proportion MT of total production is stolen.
The government problem is to choose the level of law enforcement for next period,
0, which incurs a cost given by C(; 0), a function of the current level and the new
level of law enforcement. This gives us the following Bellman equation:
V (;MJ) = max
0
z(1 MJ)(1  MT )  C(; 0) + V (0;M 0J) (2.15)
We assume that the government has solved the agent's and rm's problems and
therefore model the proportion of thieves MT and the transition function of the propor-
tion of agents incarcerated M 0J as reduced form functions of state and choice variables
of the government. Specically, the level of theft is solely a function of the current level
of law enforcement, , and the incarceration rate next period, M 0J , is a function of the
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current incarceration rate, MJ , the fraction of agents choosing to steal today, MT , and
the current level of law enforcement, .
The equilibrium to this problem is a value function and policy function which solve
Equation (2.15).
2.5.2 Multiple Steady States
Over a subset of the parameter space we observe a policy function that results in multiple
steady states which gives intuition for why we observe countries which persist with a
low level of public law enforcement while other countries remain at a high level of public
law enforcement. In Figure 2.12 we present sample output for our model for which there
exist two stable steady states.16 The arrows demonstrate how two countries which begin
with relatively similar levels of public law enforcement ( = :4 and  = :45) will diverge
over time until they reach the steady states represented by red dots at  = 0:065 and
 = 1.
The intuition for why this occurs is relatively straightforward. The steady state
welfare of the  = 1 equilibrium is much larger than the equilibrium with a lower value
for . However, the welfare in between these two steady states is U shaped and the
transition cost of moving the level of public law enforcement prevents countries from
making large jumps from one point to another. Maintaining a level of law enforcement in
the middle of the two steady states is costly and doesn't suciently disincent crime but
incurs a large cost in lost production due to incarceration. Countries with suciently
high initial levels of public law enforcement  will continue investment in additional 
to a level which lowers theft and incarceration rates and obtains the steady state with
the high level of welfare. Countries with lower initial levels of public law enforcement
will not nd it optimal to continue through the transition to a high level of  going
through periods of high incarceration and relatively low deterrence of theft. Instead
these countries nd it optimal to lower public law enforcement to a relatively inexpensive
level. This is represented in Figure 2.12.
16In this scenario we used functional formsMT = 1  ,M 0J = MT , and C(; 0) = :52+5( 0)2.
For parameters we chose to let  = 0:52,  = :96, and z = 1.
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Figure 2.12: Multiple Steady States
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we propose a model of theft, private security and public law enforcement
which matches a number of patterns in the micro data. Theft lowers total production
directly and indirectly. First, theft acts as a wedge similar to a tax for rms which
causes rms to be ineciently small since the marginal product of labor is greater than
the wage rate in equilibria with positive amounts of theft. Private law enforcement
helps decrease this wedge, but in order to do so, some of the labor force is taken away
from producing the consumption good and used to provide security.
Perhaps the most surprising result of our model is that total production and welfare
are not monotonic in levels of public law enforcement. The interaction of theft and
public law enforcement is the source of the indirect mechanism that aects the total
level of production in the economy. Public law enforcement can reduce total production
and welfare because incarcerated agents are removed from the labor force. However,
it also increases the disincentives of theft, which causes a reduction in the measure of
agents who choose to become thieves. This, in turn, reduces the measure of agents who
are incarcerated. The interaction of these two forces can cause non-monotonic eects
on the total level of production and welfare which might explain why we observe such
vastly dierent levels of public law enforcement across countries. A simple example is
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oered in our dynamic extension. Specically, countries with low levels of public law
enforcement do not have immediate benets from small increases to the level of public
law enforcement. The costly transition to a high level of public law enforcement may
be sucient to deter some countries from ever making the investment.
Chapter 3
Leverage Away Your Wedge: An
Analysis of Banks' Impact on
Output
3.1 Introduction
The banking sector doesn't produce a tangible product but it is clear that it has a
tangible eect on the real economy. In this paper we develop a model which allows
us to analyze what these eects are and the channel through which these eects are
transmitted. Using our model we nd that the leverage of banks has both direct and
indirect eects on occupational choice, and also indirectly eects the distribution of rm
sizes, and real output. The primary channel through which these eects are transmitted
is through the spread between the interest rate that banks charge for loans and the
interest rate that banks pay for deposits which we will henceforth refer to as the margin
of intermediation. We will consider a model without risk so we will only focus on the
downside of having limits on the leverage of banks.
In our model rms need to pay for their workers before they produce, in the spirit of
Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe (2012). To do this, they can either use their own assets or can
take out loans from the banking sector. The primary result from our model is that as
banks become less leveraged (i.e. the ratio between deposits over equity decreases), the
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resulting margin of intermediation in the general equilibrium increases. This margin is
responsible for two types of distortion relative to a model with an unconstrained banking
sector: First, rms with the same productivity will hire dierent amounts of workers
depending on the assets of the rm. Second, skilled unwealthy consumers will choose to
work rather than become entrepreneurs, while nonskilled wealthy consumers will choose
to manage rms. In addition, lower leverage in the banking sector will require more
bankers to satisfy the demand for loans and deposits. Each of these factors results in a
reduction in real output.
An appealing feature of our model is its clear and intuitive characterization of occu-
pational choice among consumers. We allow heterogeneity in consumers along two di-
mensions; namely, wealth and skill. Rich unskilled consumers choose to become bankers
while unwealthy unskilled consumers become workers and skilled consumers choose to
manage rms as entrepreneurs. In the parameterization where banks are innitely
leveraged, real allocations are not dependant upon wealth and the model collapses to
the model in Lucas (1978) where wealth only aects consumption but has no eect on
occupational choice or real output. In this case skilled consumers choose to become
entrepreneurs while unskilled consumers choose to work; and the marginal productiv-
ity across rms is constant and rms are perfectly assortative in size along the skill of
entrepreneurs.
As the leverage of the banking sector decreases, the margin of intermediation in-
creases. As a consequence, the wealth of consumers begin to have real eects on oc-
cupational choices of consumers and the hiring decisions of rms, since this causes the
cost of the marginal worker to dier based on the wealth of the entrepreneur. Es-
sentially, wealthy entrepreneurs face a lower marginal cost per worker than unwealthy
entrepreneurs, which causes rm size to vary across the wealth of entrepreneurs. For
two entrepreneurs with the same skill level, the wealthier entrepreneur will hire more
workers than the less wealthy entrepreneur. If the skill of the entrepreneurs is su-
ciently small, it is possible that the unwealthy consumer will prefer to become a worker
rather than manage a rm and face the higher interest rate on loans required to hire
workers. Additionally, it is possible that wealthy consumers, who would have worked in
the scenario where banks are innitely leveraged, are incented to become entrepreneurs
due to the reduction in the return of their assets. Even though their skill at managing
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workers is low relative to the rest of the entrepreneurs, they can obtain a higher return
from using their wealth to hire workers rather than investing their assets with banks.
We relate our model to the misallocation literature. Banerjee and Moll (2010),
Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011) and Midrigan and Xu (2014), among others, analyze
the role of misallocation on the productivity of an economy. In these models, misallo-
cation arises mostly due to nancial constraints. In our case, it is the leverage of the
nancial intermediaries that causes the misallocation.
Our model is also related to the literature relating nancial development and e-
ciency with production. Levine (2005) oers a comprehensive literature review of this
eld. In Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang (2010) and Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang
(2013) costly state verication causes a dierence in the marginal product of capital and
its user cost. In our model it is the leverage of the banking sector that causes dierent
consumers to face dierent interest rates.
Erosa (2001) is probably the most similar model to ours. In his model interme-
diation costs cause an exogenous margin of intermediation. In our case this margin
of intermediation arises endogenously from the leverage of the banking sector. Erosa
(2001) also analyzes occupational choice, although in his setup the only heterogeneity
of consumers is in age, as his model is dynamic. We explore an additional occupational
choice; namely, becoming a banker.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the model; Section 3.3
characterizes the solution to the model; Section 3.4 presents a benchmark model without
limits on the leverage of banks; Section 3.5 shows the main results; Section 3.6 highlights
preliminary relations we observe in data. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Model
We consider a two period model. Consumers are heterogeneously endowed with skill
and wealth. At the beginning of the rst period they choose whether to become workers,
entrepreneurs or bankers. Workers receive their wages in the rst period and save to
consume in the second period. Entrepreneurs manage rms and need to pay their
workers in the rst period. Nonetheless, the rms they manage produce in the second
period. Therefore they might need to borrow from banks in order to pay their wage
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bills. Bankers set up a bank in the rst period and receive the prots from the bank in
the second period. Banks take deposits from consumers and lend to rms. They face
an exogenous limit on their leverage.
We assume that there is a unit measure of consumers who maximize utility by
choosing to be an entrepreneur, a worker or a banker. Each consumer is endowed
with a skill level z and some wealth a. We assume that z and a are drawn from
a distribution with positive support that we will denote by G(z  a). A consumer's
decision is characterized by z and a, so we will denote consumers by the realizations of
these random variables. Consider consumer (z; a). He solves the following problem
u(z; a) = max
O

uW(a); uE(z; a); uB(a)
	
; (3.1)
where uW(a) denotes the utility derived from becoming a worker, uE(z; a) is the utility
from becoming an entrepreneur, and uB(a) is the utility from becoming a banker.
3.2.1 Workers
Denote the set of workers by W. In period 1 workers use their wages w and wealth to
consume and to save, s. In the second period the worker's income is given by the return
on savings, rD. The utility of being a worker with wealth a is given by (3.2).
uW(a) = max
s
ln c1 +  ln c2 (3.2)
c1 = w + a  s
c2 = (1 + r
D)s:
3.2.2 Entrepreneurs
Denote the set of entrepreneurs by E . In the rst period entrepreneurs use their wealth
to consume, to pay for the workers l they hire, and they can save or borrow. In the
second period entrepreneurs consume the production of the rm. If they borrowed in
the rst period, they repay their debt at an interest rate of rL. If they saved, they get
a return of rD on their savings. The utility of being an entrepreneur with skill z and
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wealth a is given by (3.3).
uE(z; a) = max
s;l
ln c1 +  ln c2 (3.3)
c1 = a  wl   s
c2 = zl
 + (1 + rL)s1fs<0g
+ (1 + rD)s1fs0g:
Each entrepreneurs belongs to one of three types: Entrepreneurs that borrow to pay
for their workers, s < 0, entrepreneurs that have enough wealth to pay for workers and
deposit the dierence, s > 0, and entrepreneurs that spend all their available wealth to
hire workers, s = 0. We will denote by EL the set of entrepreneurs that borrow, by ED
the set of entrepreneurs that save and by EO the rest of entrepreneurs.
3.2.3 Bankers
Denote the set of bankers by B. In the rst period bankers consume part of their wealth.
The rest of their wealth, s, is used as equity for the bank they manage. In the second
period bankers consume the prots from that bank. The utility of a banker with wealth
a is given by (3.4).
uB(a) = max
s
ln c1 +  ln c2 (3.4)
c1 = a  s
c2 = 
B(s):
The prots of a bank with equity s are given by (3.5)
B(s)  max
L;D
(1 + rL)L  (1 + rD)D (3.5)
s. t. D + s = L
D
s
 :
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The rst constraint in (3.5) is the balance sheet constraint of the bank: The bank lends
its equity and the deposits it takes. The second constraint implies that there is a limit
on how many resources a bank can intermediate. Specically the limit is on how many
deposits a bank can take per unit of equity. This limit is exogenous and we denote it
by .
We now dene an equilibrium for this economy:
Denition 2. An equilibrium for this economy is allocations xW(a)  fsW(a)g, xE(z; a) 
fl(z; a); sE(z; a)g, xB(a)  fsB(a)g and xB(s)  LB(s); DB(s)	, prices p  fw; rL; rDg
and sets W, B and E such that
1. W, B and E are such that O(z; a) is a solution to (3.1) for all (z; a);
2. given p, xW(a) is a solution to (3.2);
3. given p, xE(z; a) is a solution to (3.3);
4. given p, xB(a) is a solution to (3.4);
5. given p, xB(s) is a solution to (3.5);
6. and markets clear:
(a) Deposits:Z
W
sW(a)dG(z  a) +
Z
ED
sE(z; a)dG(z  a) =
Z
B
DB(sB(a))dG(z  a);
(b) loans: Z
EL
sE(z; a)dG(z  a) +
Z
B
LB(sB(a))dG(z  a) = 0;
(c) labor: Z
W
dG(z  a) =
Z
E
l(z; a)dG(z  a);
(d) goods: Z
c1(z; a)dG(z  a) =
Z
adG(z  a)Z
c2(z; a)dG(z  a) =
Z
E
zl(z; a)dG(z  a):
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3.3 Characterizing the model
We will rst prove that in equilibrium the interest rate of loans is greater than the
interest rate on deposits. This implies that there is an incentive to manage a bank,
rather to deposit in one. Additionally, the prots from banks are linear in the wealth
that is used to run them.
Lemma 3. In equilibrium rL  rD >  1 and rL = rD only as  ! 1. Furthermore,
the prots of a bank with equity s can be written as B(s) = (1 + rB)s with
rB = rL + (rL   rD);
rB  rD and rB = rD only as  ! 1. Additionally, loan supply and deposit demand
are given by
Dd(s) = s (3.6)
Ls(s) = (1 + )s:
Proof. First notice that if rD   1, then banks will demand an innite amount of
deposits. If rL < rD then banks will not supply loans since the cost of deposits is higher
than the revenue they can get from lending, so it must be the case that rL  rD. Now,
the bank is risk neutral. Therefore the second constraint in (3.5) binds. The supply of
loans follows from the balance sheet constraint (D(s) + s = L(s)). This proves (3.6).
Plugging (3.6) into the objective function of (3.5) yields B(s) = (1 + rB)s, where
rB  rL+(rL  rD). Now, notice that the only way to have a nite rB as !1 is if
rL = rD. Additionally, rB can also be written as rB = rD+(1+)
 
rL   rD. rL  rD
implies that rB  rD, with equality only as !1.
Now we will prove that both workers and bankers save in the rst period. The
reason for this is that these consumers have no source of income in the second period.
Lemma 4 characterizes the solution of (3.2) and (3.4).
Lemma 4. The solution of (3.2) is
sW(a) =

1 + 
(w + a): (3.7)
70
The solution of (3.4) is
sB(a) =

1 + 
a: (3.8)
Proof. The rst order condition of (3.2) is
1
w + a  s =

s
:
Lemma 3 implies that the rst order condition of (3.4) can be written as
1
a  s =

s
:
Solving for s in (3.7) and (3.8) yields the result.
Finally we will characterize the solution of (3.3). Since entrepreneurs that borrow
and entrepreneurs that save face a dierent interest rate, there will be misallocation:
Firms with the same productivity have dierent sizes depending on the wealth of the
entrepreneur that manages them. The misallocation depends on the margin of interme-
diation.
Lemma 5. The solution of (3.3) is
l(z; a) =
8>>>><>>>>:

z
(1+rL)w
 1
1 
if a < EO;EL(z)

1+
a
w if EO;EL(z)  a < ED;EO(z)
z
(1+rD)w
 1
1 
if a  ED;EO(z)
sE(z; a) =
8>>>><>>>>:

1+a  1+1+

z
1+rL
 1
1   
w
 
1  if a < EO;EL(z)
0 if EO;EL(z)  a < ED;EO(z)

1+a  1+1+

z
1+rD
 1
1   
w
 
1  if a  ED;EO(z);
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where
ED;EO(z) 
1 + 


z
1 + rD
 1
1  
w
 
1 
EO;EL(z) 
1 + 


z
1 + rL
 1
1  
w
 
1 
:
Entrepreneurs with a < EO;EL(z) will borrow, entrepreneurs with a  ED;EO(z) will save
and entrepreneurs with EO;EL(z)  a < ED;EO(z) will spend all their available wealth in
paying for workers.
Proof. If s 6= 0 the rst order conditions of (3.3) can be written as
w
a  wl   s =
zl 1
zl + (1 + r)s
1
a  wl   s =
(1 + r)
zl + (1 + r)s
;
where r = rD if s > 0 and r = rL if s < 0. If s = 0 rst order conditions of (3.3) can
be written as
w
a  wl =

l
:
The proof of the Lemma follows from solving for s and l. The expressions for ED;EO(z)
and EO;EL(z) follow from analyzing when s > 0 or s < 0.
For the moment x w. Then there are two eects on entrepreneurs of having a
positive margin of intermediation: The larger this margin is, the bigger the range in
rm sizes for consumers with the same skill z across the spectrum of wealth a.
Wealthy entrepreneurs will have enough wealth to pay for their workers and save
the dierence. Due to this, the marginal cost of an employee will depend on rD. On
the other hand, unwealthy entrepreneurs need to borrow to pay for their workers, so
the marginal cost of an employee will depend on rL. Figure 3.1a highlights this point.
Additionally, a higher margin of intermediation implies that the dierence in wealth
between an entrepreneur that is able to save and an entrepreneur that borrows is higher.
In other words, holding w constant, a higher margin of intermediation implies a larger
dierence between ED;EO(z) and EO;EL(z). As a consequence less entrepreneurs use
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banks as nancial intermediaries, since more entrepreneurs use all their available wealth
to hire workers. See Figure3.1b for a graphical representation of this point.
Figure 3.1: Entrepreneur with skill z
(a) l(z; a)
δEO ,EL(z) δED ,EO(z) a
l(z, ·)
(b) sE(z; a)
0
δEO ,EL(z) δED ,EO(z)
a
s(z, ·)
Corollary 2 shows misallocation in a slightly dierent way. Let r(z; a) be the
marginal return of hiring l(z; a) workers. This return will be decreasing in the wealth of
the entrepreneur. r(z; a) is the opportunity cost of using wealth for hiring workers. If
an unwealthy entrepreneur uses one extra dollar to hire workers, he is borrowing more
and therefore is spending rL. On the other hand, an extra unit of wealth that a wealthy
entrepreneur spends on hiring workers could be used to get a return of rD if it was used
instead to save in a bank.
Corollary 2. Let r(z; a)  zl(z;a) 1w   1. Then
r(z; a) =
8>><>>:
rL if a < EO;EL(z)
z
 

w
 1+
a
1    1 if EO;EL(z)  a < ED;EO(z)
rD if a  ED;EO(z):
r(z; a) is continuous and decreasing in a.
With the results shown in Lemmas 4 and 5 we are able to determine the occupational
choice of consumers. In C.1 we determine explicitly the boundaries in skill and wealth
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that determine the occupational choice of consumers as a function of the prices in this
economy. That allows us to fully characterize each consumer, taking prices as given.
From Lemma 5 we conclude that within the set of entrepreneurs, wealthy en-
trepreneurs (high a) will be able to save and unwealthy entrepreneurs (low a) will
need to borrow. In general we nd that consumers with low wealth a and low skill z
will choose to become workers. The fact that these consumers have low skill makes it
better for them to work than to set up a rm. Additionally, their low wealth makes it
optimal for them to get an extra source of income in the rst period. The only way to
do this is by becoming a worker.
On the other hand, consumers with low skill and high wealth will become bankers.
Similar to workers, having a low skill level is a deterrent from becoming an entrepreneur.
Nonetheless, the high level of wealth makes it better for these consumers to set up
a bank, rather than to become workers, since rB > rD in equilibrium. Finally, en-
trepreneurs will be consumers with high skill. As shown in Lemma 5, the level of wealth
will aect the size of the rm that they manage.
It is worth mentioning that the occupational choice of consumers depends on their
wealth. Figure 3.2 shows graphically the dierent occupation choices of consumers in
(z; a) space.
Figure 3.2: Types of consumers depending on skill and wealth
W
B
E
z
a
B: Bankers. W: Workers. E : Entrepreneurs.
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3.4 Model with perfectly ecient banking sector
Contrast the model characterized in Section 3.3 with a model where the margin of
intermediation is 0. In this model there will only be an interest rate r. As mentioned in
Lemma 3, this can be achieved in the limit as  approaches innity. Recall from Lemma
3 that in this case rB = rL = rD, so only a consumer with innite wealth will be willing
to be a banker and this bank will be innitely leveraged and have 0 prots. We can
interpret this case as a model where consumers do not need a nancial intermediary to
get wealth from consumers that are willing to save to borrowing entrepreneurs. In this
case consumers choose whether to become entrepreneurs or workers. The utility of a
consumer endowed with skill level z and wealth a is given by
u(z; a) = max
O

uE(z; a); uW(a)
	
; (3.9)
where
uW(a) = max
s
ln c1 +  ln c2 (3.10)
c1 = w + a  s
c2 = (1 + r)s:
and
uE(z; a) = max
s;l
ln c1 +  ln c2 (3.11)
c1 = a  wl   s
c2 = zl
 + (1 + r)s:
In this case, entrepreneurs face the same interest rate, regardless if they borrow or
save. Workers, as before, will decide to save since they don't have any source of income
in the second period. An equilibrium for this economy is dened as follows.
Denition 3. An equilibrium for this economy is allocations xW(a)  fsW(a)g and
xE(z; a)  fl(z); sE(z; a)g, prices p  fw; rg and sets W and E such that
1. W and E are such that O(z; a) is a solution to (3.9) for all (z; a);
75
2. given p, xW(a) is a solution to (3.10);
3. given p, xE(z; a) is a solution to (3.11);
4. and markets clear:
(a) Savings: Z
W
sW(a)dG(z  a) +
Z
E
sE(z; a)dG(z  a) = 0;
(b) labor: Z
W
dG(z  a) =
Z
E
l(z)dG(z  a);
(c) goods: Z
c1(z; a)dG(z  a) =
Z
adG(z  a))Z
c2(z; a)dG(z  a) =
Z
E
zl(z)dG(z  a):
Lemmas 6 and 7 characterize the solution to (3.10) and (3.11).
Lemma 6. The solution of (3.10) is
sW(a) =

1 + 
(w + a):
Proof. The rst order condition of (3.10) is
1
w + a  s =

s
:
Solving for s yields the result.
Lemma 7. The solution of (3.11) is
l(z) =

z
(1 + r)w
 1
1 
:
sE(z; a) =

1 + 
a  1 + 
1 + 

z
1 + r
 1
1  
w
 
1 
:
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Let
ED;EL(z) 
1 + 


z
1 + r
 1
1  
w
 
1 
:
Entrepreneurs will save if a  ED;EL(z) and borrow otherwise.
Proof. The rst order conditions of (3.11) can be written as
w
a  wl   s =
zl 1
zl + (1 + r)s
1
a  wl   s =
(1 + r)
zl + (1 + r)s
;
The proof of the Lemma follows from solving for s and l. The expression for ED;EL(z)
follows from analyzing when s > 0 or s < 0.
Notice that in this case the size of the rms does not depend on the wealth of the
entrepreneur. With the results shown in Lemmas 6 and 7 we are able to determine the
occupational choice of consumers. In C.2 we determine the explicit boundaries between
the two occupational choices of consumers as functions of w and r.
Since every consumer faces the same interest rate, the boundary that determines
the occupational choice between workers and entrepreneurs will not depend on the level
of wealth. Similar to Lucas (1978), the occupation choice depends exclusively on skill
level. Less skilled consumers will become workers since the consumption they get from
setting up a rm would be lower than consumption from working. Figure 3.3 shows a
graphical characterization of consumers in the (z; a) space.
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Figure 3.3: Types of consumers depending on skill and wealth
W E
z
a
W: Workers. E : Entrepreneurs.
We solve this model by stating and solving an equivalent Social Planner Problem
(See C.3).
3.5 Results
We rst prove a lemma that allows us to characterize labor remuneration in the model.
We then provide an example which allows us to get a closed form solution. Finally we
show some numerical results to highlight the main results of our model.
3.5.1 Labor remuneration is constant
Lemma 8 proves that labor remuneration in the model is constant.
Lemma 8. Let A be the total amount of wealth in the economy and denote the mass of
workers by MW . Then
wMW = A:
Proof. See C.4.
We give an overview of the proof of Lemma 8. Consider rst the case where wages
are paid in the same period as when production takes place. Given the production
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function of the rms in our model, it holds that wMW = Y , where Y denotes total
production. Now, in our model wages are paid in period 1, while production takes place
in period 2. Therefore the marginal cost of labor depends on interest rates. that is,
(1 + ~r)wMW = Y; (3.12)
where ~r is an average interest rate of the economy.1 Additionally, in our model total
consumption in the rst period is given by the total amount of wealth in the economy,
A, while total consumption in the second period equals total production, Y . Finally,
the fact that consumers have log utility implies the following aggregate Euler equation
Y = (1 + ~r)A: (3.13)
Plugging in (3.12) into (3.13) yields the result in the Lemma. Lemma 8 implies that the
eect of productivity aects wages indirectly through the measure of workers. In other
words, more productive economies will have higher wages since the measure of workers
will be smaller.
3.5.2 Example
We consider a particular distribution that allows us to nd a close form solution to
the model. Given constraints on parameters, we are able to abstract from changes in
occupational choice to focus on the main source of distortion; namely, the dierence in
size by rms with the same productivity. Finally we are able to derive an analytical
solution for total output and show that it is increasing in  since output decreases with
the margin of intermediation. The distribution we consider is specied in Denition 4.
Denition 4. Let eG() be the following distribution on z and a:
1. z takes values z1 and z2, with weights z and 1   z, respectively. We assume
z1 < z2.
2. For z = z1: a takes values a1 and a2, with weights a and 1  a, respectively. We
assume a1 < a2.
1Recall from the corollary to Lemma 5 that each type of entrepreneur faces a dierent interest rate
in this economy.
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3. For z = z2: Continuum of values of a distributed according to a uniform distribu-
tion between 0 and a.
Proposition 2 states the equilibrium prices and occupational choices in this economy.
The specic set of assumptions on parameters, as well as the proof of the proposition,
can be found in C.4.
Proposition 2. Given eG(),
w = 
aza1 + (1  a)za2 + (1  z)a2
az
1 + rL =
z2

(1 + )1 
 
az
aza1 + (1  a)za2 + (1  z)a2
!
1  z
2a(1 + )(1  a)za2
 1 
2
1 + rD =
z2

(1 + )1 
 
az
aza1 + (1  a)za2 + (1  z)a2
!

0B@ 1
1 

2
a(1 z)
 1
2  
(  )(1  a)za2   (1  z)a2   (1 + )aza1
 1
2
1CA
1 
and occupational choices
W = (z1; a1)
B = (z1; a2)
ED = f(z2; a) : ED;EO(z2)  a  ag
EO = f(z2; a) : EO;EL(z2)  a < ED;EO(z2)g
EL = f(z2; a) : 0  a < EO;EL(z2)g
are an equilibrium in this economy, where ED;EO(z), and EO;EL(z) are as dened in
Lemma 5.
Proof. See C.4.
The fact that the margin of intermediation is decreasing in  is a corollary to Propo-
sition 2.
Corollary 3. rL   rD is decreasing in .
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Additionally, we prove that the dierences in sizes for rms decreases as  increases.
Corollary 4. The dispersion in rm size is decreasing in .
Proof. The dispersion in sizes of rms is increasing in rL   rD.
Furthermore, from Proposition 2 we are able to derive an expression for total output
in this economy. Proposition 3 proves that total production is increasing in , since it
is decreasing in the margin of intermediation.
Proposition 3. Let
CL  1  z
2a(1 + )(1  a)za2
CD  1
1 

2
a(1 z)
 1
2  
(  )(1  a)za2   (1  z)a2   (1 + )aza1
 1
2
:
Then total output in this economy is equal to
Y = z2
1  z
a

1
1 + 
MW
A
 "
a

1
CD

  
1 + 
"
1
CD
1+
 

1
CL
 1+
2
##
Furthermore, an increase in  decreases the last term in Y , which is a function of
rL   rD.
Proof. See C.4.
3.5.3 Numerical solutions
We now solve the model numerically by assuming that z and a are drawn from inde-
pendent uniform distributions. We also set  = 0:7 and  = 0:96.2 We analyze what
happens as  increases. We nd that rL   rD is decreasing in . Additional to the
eect this has on the dispersion on the sizes of rms with the same productivity, we also
nd that there is an eect on occupational choice; namely, we observe that unskilled
consumers who choose to become entrepreneurs in economies with low levels of , will
choose to become workers as  increases. Also, skilled consumers who became workers
for low levels of , choose to manage rms for higher limits on the leverage of banks.
2The results we show hold qualitatively for various parameterizations.
81
As  increases, the margin of intermediation goes down, which implies lower misallo-
cation: The heterogeneity in size among rms with same productivity decreases. Figure
3.4 shows what happens to misallocation as  increases. Figure 3.4a shows the eect
on rm size for an entrepreneur under dierent values of . As  ! 1 misallocation
disappears. Firms with the same productivity will have the same size, as the continuous
line shows. For nite values of , there will be misallocation.
Figure 3.4: Entrepreneur with skill z
(a) Firm size
λ → ∞
↓
λ = 2.3 →
← λ = 1.5
l(z, ·)
a
(b) Saving for entrepreneurs
0
λ→∞
ց
λ = 2.3 →
↑
λ = 1.5
s(z, ·)
a
Now, recall that the kinks in rm size correspond to values of a such that a = EO;EL
and a = ED;EO . A higher value of  implies a smaller dierence between EO;EL and
ED;EO . A consequence of a higher  is that more entrepreneurs use banks as nancial
intermediaries, since less entrepreneurs use all their available wealth to hire workers.
Figure 3.4b highlights this point: higher levels of  imply less entrepreneurs that neither
borrow nor save.
Furthermore, as  increases another distortion diminishes: Skilled consumers choose
to manage rms, while unskilled consumers become workers. That is, consumers that
choose to become entrepreneurs when  <1, choose to become workers when !1.
Similarly, consumers that choose to become workers when  < 1, decide to become
entrepreneurs when !1.
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Figure 3.5: Boundaries for dierent values of 
(a) !1
W E
z
a
(b)  = 4:00
W
B
E
z
a
(c)  = 2:33
W
B
E
z
a
(d)  = 1:5
W
B
E
z
a
B: Bankers. W: Workers. E : Entrepreneurs.
To understand the source of this distortion, Figure 3.6 shows the occupational choices
of consumers in the (z; a) space for dierent values of . As  increases the threshold
in wealth above which consumers prefer to become bankers over workers goes up. That
is, less workers become bankers. The main reason for why this occurs is that the spread
between rB and rD decreases, which is largely a consequence of the decrease in the
margin of intermediation.
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Figure 3.6: Changes in occupational choice
(a) Skilled consumers become entrepreneurs...
W
B
E
z
a
(b) ... and unskilled consumers become workers
W
B
E
z
a
B: Bankers. W: Workers. E : Entrepreneurs.
More importantly, as  increases, the slope of the the boundary that determines the
occupation choice between workers and entrepreneurs increases. That is, the decision
between becoming a worker or an entrepreneur becomes less dependent on the level
of wealth of the consumer than on its skill. Given that the margin of intermediation
is decreasing in , Lemma 9 shows this by proving that in an economy with  < 1
an unwealthy consumer needs to have a higher skill than a wealthy consumer in order
to become an entrepreneur. Furthermore, this dierence is increasing in the margin
of intermediation. We prove the lemma for a particular case in which the minimum
value that a attains is 0. Nonetheless the result holds for any general distribution with
positive support.
Lemma 9. A consumer with wealth above a1 =
1+
(1 )w will become an entrepreneur
as long as z  z1 where
z1 

1
1  
1  1


w(1 + rD):
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A consumer with no wealth (a = 0) will become an entrepreneur as long as z  z2 where
z2 

1
1  
1  1


w(1 + rL)

1 + rD
1 + rL
(1 )
1+
:
z2 > z1 as long as r
L   rD > 0. Furthermore, z2   z1 is decreasing in .
Figure 3.7: Production relative to economy with  = 9
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Proof. See C.4.
Figure 3.6 shows the eect of the distortion on occupation choice. Figure 3.6a
shows consumers who choose to become entrepreneurs in an economy without limits
on leverage ( ! 1) but in the model with  < 1 choose to become workers. That
is, without limits on leverage these consumers choose to manage rms since they are
skilled consumers. However, these consumers have low wealth. If they chose to become
entrepreneurs when  <1, they would need to nance a large portion of their wage bill
by borrowing. Therefore, in an economy with  < 1 they are better o by becoming
workers.
On the other hand, Figure 3.6b shows the consumers that would choose to become
entrepreneurs in an economy with limits on leverage ( < 1). These consumers are
wealthy enough to be able to nance a signicant share of their wage bill without needing
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to borrow. As  increases, these consumers are better o becoming workers, since they
are not skilled enough.
The increased distortions mentioned before cause production to be lower for low
levels of . Figure 3.7 shows how production is increasing in . In this gure we compare
the production in an economy with a given level of  relative to the production of an
economy with  = 9. With the current parametrization we are able to explain up to
56% dierences in production.
We also analyze what happens as we change other parameters in the model. In
particular, we analyze what happens as we change the ratio of wealth to skill in the
model. That is, let a be the supremum of the support of the distribution for wealth
and let z be the equivalent for skill. We analyze changes in az for a given value of  and
holding other parameters constant. We nd that distortions of having limits on leverage
decrease: As this ratio increases, consumers are wealthier in the rst period, relative
to the second period. This implies that interest rates will be lower in equilibrium since
there is more wealth that is going to be saved and less will be borrowed. Furthermore,
banks become bigger, which causes the margin of intermediation to be lower.
3.6 Data
The objective of this section is to highlight that data supports the mechanism we men-
tion in the model. That is, there is a negative correlation between the margin of interme-
diation and production. Additionally, we document that the margin of intermediation
is negatively correlated with nancial inclusion, where nancial inclusion is dened as
the percentage of rms that rely on banks to nance their working capital. This is
consistent with the results in the model since a lower margin of intermediation implies
that the measure of rms that borrow from banks increases.
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Table 3.1: Production vs margin of intermediation
Dependent Variable: log GDP per capita
Margin of intermediation  0:880
(0:072)
Number of observations 2,886
OLS estimation. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
***: Signicant at 1%.
Country xed eects.
We use data from the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD). This is an
extensive database that includes measures of nancial development for over 200 countries
from 1960 to 2010.3 The measures are divided in metrics of depth, access, eciency and
stability of the nancial markets in order to analyze the dierent roles that nancial
systems play in an economy. See Cihak, Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen, and Levine (2012) for
a further description of the database.
Table 3.2: Financial inclusion vs margin of intermediation
Dependent Variable: Financial inclusion
Margin of intermediation  1:117
(0:599)
Number of observations 134
OLS estimation. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
*: Signicant at 10%.
Country xed eects.
We only consider countries whose population has been above 1,000,000 at some point
in time and we estimate the following econometric model:
GDPi;t = 1 + 2MIi;t + i + "i;t:
We dene GDPi;t as the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in 2000 US dollars. MI is
the margin of intermediation, dened in the database as the bank-lending deposit spread.
We include country xed eects to control for other country specic characteristics.
3Some variables are available for a shorter span of time.
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Table 3.1 shows the results of the estimation. We observe that there is a negative
correlation between the margin of intermediation and the GDP per capita. An increase
of a percentage point in the margin of intermediation results in a decrease of 0:9%
in GDP per capita. This is consistent with the results shown in Erosa (2001) and
Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang (2013).
We then test other implications of the model; namely, as the margin of intermedia-
tion decreases more rms rely on the banking sector to nance their wage bill. For this
we estimate (3.14):
FIi;t = 1 + 2MIi;t + i + "i;t: (3.14)
We dene FI as the percentage of rms that use banks to nance working capital,
which we denote as nancial inclusion. Cihak, Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen, and Levine
(2012) compiled this measure from the Enterprise Surveys, which are surveys conducted
by the World Bank to emerging countries (See The World Bank (2012) for further
details). As mentioned in Cihak, Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen, and Levine (2012), nancial
development is positively correlated with income. Therefore, it is safe to assume that
rms that don't rely on banks to nance their working capital are most likely not able
to use nancial markets to save either. Table 3.2 shows the result of the estimation
of (3.14). We document a negative correlation between nancial inclusion and the
margin of intermediation: a one percent increase in the margin of intermediation reduces
the percentage of rms using banks to nance their working capital by 1:1%. This is
consistent with the results of our model: as the margin of intermediation decreases, the
measure of rms that borrow from banks increases.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the relationship between the leverage of banks and real allocations.
Economies with banks that have a lower leverage experience a higher margin of interme-
diation, which aects both the occupational choices of consumers and the distribution
of rm sizes across the wealth of individuals. When the margin of intermediation is
large, wealthy entrepreneurs can hire workers for a signicantly lower cost relative to
unwealthy entrepreneurs. This variation in marginal costs of employees translates into
heterogeneity in rm sizes across the spectrum of wealth for otherwise identical rms.
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Occupational choice is also distorted: consumers with substantial skill but suciently
small wealth may be dissuaded from managing rms due to the large costs of taking
out loans, whereas wealthy but less skilled consumers may manage rms due to their
relative advantage in inexpensive nancing and the low opportunity cost of using those
funds to hire workers rather than depositing. Future work will focus on analyzing the
tradeo of having limits on the leverage of banks in an economy with risk.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Selecting S=J
As outlined in Section 1.5, we use data from the supplemental questions for the CPS
to infer the relative productivity of an senior to an junior worker. Unfortunately these
supplements are not administered every year and the questions have varied somewhat
over time. The rst time these supplemental questions were asked was in 1973, questions
inquiring about displacement as well as prior and current wages were not asked again
until 1984 and have continued to be included bi-annually through 2010.
Following the method used in Topel (1991) we restrict attention to male respondents
between the ages of 20 and 60 whose jobs end exogenously. We then deate nominal
wages by the GNP price deator for consumption expenditure. For these workers we
calculate the average change in log weekly wages for the prior and current jobs and use
equation 1.2 to calculate the ratio of S=J implied by the data through the lens of our
model.
The drop in wages following an exogenous separation is aected by the business
cycle. Specically, the rst survey conducted immediately following a recession gives
a drop in wages larger than the average drop experienced immediately following or
preceding the survey. We therefore calculate the implied S=J both including and
excluding these points. For the supplemental survey administered prior to the double
dip recession1 we nd an average change in log weekly wages of  2:7% which implies a
1Supplemental survey questions which include data regarding wages of the prior and current job were
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value of S=J of 1:55. When we include the 1984 data point we observe a change in
log weekly wages of  10:7% which implies a value of S=J of 3:40. For those surveys
administered after the double dip recession we nd an average change in log weekly
wages of  14:7% which implies a value of S=J of 4:45. When we exclude the post
recession data points we observe an average change in log weekly wages of  11:5% which
implies a value of S=J of 3:59. In our benchmark model we select an S=J of 2 for
the \fast recovery" recessions and 4 for the \slow recovery" recessions.
A.2 Aggregate Uncertainty Shocks
In order to analyze the transition path implied by our model we apply a one period
exogenous aggregate uncertainty shock applied to the distribution of the productivity
draws. In the steady state the distribution of shocks is represented by the uniform
distribution f(z) = 1 for z 2 [0; 1]. To induce a recession we apply a one period
shock which is a mean preserving spread on the original productivity draws for rms
and is given according to f(z) = a(z   :5)2 + (1   a12). This maintains the average
productivity across rms while increasing the weight in the tails of the distribution. A
visual representation of the uncertainty shock is displayed in Figure A.1.
only included one time before the double dip recession (in 1973). Therefore the value of S=J for the
\fast recoveries" is based on the data from this survey.
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Figure A.1: Aggregate Uncertainty Shock
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Select Proofs
B.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The production function of every rm satises Inada conditions, so ly(z) > 0
for all z 2 E. Now, the Envelope Theorem, (2.10) and the assumptions on  imply
0(z) = ly(z)

1  (1 )MTa(ls(z)jMT )

> 0. Additionally, limz!0 (z)  0. Also, (z) < w
for all z cannot be an equilibrium since in this case there would be no entrepreneurs.
On the other hand, from (2.9), (z; ) 2 T if and only if uT (z; ) > uNT (z). From
(2.2) and (2.3) we have that (z; ) 2 T if and only if
c
1  MT + (1  )T   max fw; (z)g > : (B.1)
The denition of zE and (B.1) imply the result.
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B.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Since  > 0:5, the following rst order conditions of (2.10) characterize the solution to
this problem:
w +
(1  )MT
 (ls)
= zl 1y (B.1)
w = (1  )MT ly 
0 (ls)
 (ls)
2 : (B.2)
Solving for ly in (B.1) yields
ly =
0@ z
w + (1 )MT(ls)
1A 11  : (B.3)
Plugging (B.3) in (B.2) yields
w =

z
w(ls) + (1  )MT
 1
1 
(1  )MT0(ls)(ls)
1
1  2:
Our assumption that  (ls) 


1  ls
 1 

satises
0(ls)(ls)
1
1  2 = 1;
so in equilibrium
ls(z) =
1  


(1  )MT
w
z
w
 

(1  )MT
w
 1 
: (B.4)
Plugging (B.4) into (B.3) yields
ly(z) =

z
w
 

(1  )MT
w
 11 
: (B.5)
99
Plugging (B.4) and (B.5) into (2.6) yields
(z) =

w
(1  )MT
1 z
w
 

(1  )MT
w
 1 
: (B.6)
Finally, (z) results from plugging (B.4) to (B.6) into the objective function of (2.4):
(z) =
1  

w

z
w
 

(1  )MT
w
 11 
:
B.2 Model  = 1
Assume  = 1. Depending on parameter values, in equilibrium there could be theft.
That is, even if thieves cannot consume what they steal, their aversion to becoming
thieves, , and the consumption they get when they get caught, c, can be such that
some households are better o stealing. If  = 1 then Lemma 1 implies
W =
c
1 MT   w (B.1)
E(z) =
c
1 MT   (z):
There will be theft in an equilibrium with  = 1 as long as W  inf supp fF ()g. In
this case rm z's problem is
(z)  max
ly0;ls0
zly   wly   wls: (B.2)
The solution of (B.2) is
ly(z) =
z
w
 1
1 
ls(z) = 0: (B.3)
Plugging (B.3) into (B.2) we have
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(z) = (1  )z 11 

w
 
1 
:
Notice that (z) is strictly increasing in z, so there exists a cuto zE such that (zE) =
w, which implies consumers choose to be workers for z < zE and decide to be en-
trepreneurs for z  zE and
zE =

1
1  
1  1


w:
Then the equilibrium in this case is characterized by w and MT such that
MT = F (
W )G(zE) +
Z
zzE
F (E(z))dG(z)Z
zzE
ly(z)(1  F (E(z)))dG(z) = (1  F (W ))G(zE) (B.4)
W  inf

supp fF ()g :
If the rst two equations of (B.4) are satised, but the third one is not, then we have
an economy as in Lucas (1978). That is, there is no theft in equilibrium and consumers
choose between being workers or entrepreneurs. Firms' prots are given by (B.2) with
MT = 0, so the equilibrium of this economy is characterized by (B.5).
MT = 0 (B.5)
ly(z) =
z
w
 1
1 
zE =

1

 1
1  
1 
wZ
zzE
ly(z)dG(z) = G(z
E):
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Characterizing the boundaries that determine the oc-
cupational choices
In this section we will characterize the boundaries that determine the occupational
choice of consumers given values of w, rD and rL. This characterization allows us to
analyze how changes in  aect production. Consumers will make an occupational choice
depending on the utility they can achieve from that occupation (see (3.1)). Lemma 10
characterizes the utility that consumers get depending on their occupational choice.
Lemma 10. The utility of consumer (z; a) is
u(z; a) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
(1 + ) ln a+w1+ +  ln(1 + r
D) if (z; a) 2 W
(1 + ) ln a1+ +  ln(1 + r
B) if (z; a) 2 B
(1 + ) ln

a
1+ +
1 
1+

z
1+rL
 1
1   
w
 
1 

+  ln(1 + rL) if (z; a) 2 EL
(1 + ) ln

a
1+ +
1 
1+

z
1+rD
 1
1   
w
 
1 

+  ln(1 + rD) if (z; a) 2 ED
ln a1+ +  ln z


1+
a
w

if (z; a) 2 EO:
Proof. In this model c2(z; a) = (1 + r(z; a))c1(z; a) for all consumers (z; a), where
r(z; a) = rD for (z; a) 2 W, r(z; a) = rB for (z; a) 2 B and it is dened in Corollary 2
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of Lemma 5 for (z; a) 2 E . Therefore
u(z; a) = (1 + ) ln c1(z; a) +  ln(1 + r(z; a)):
The proof of the lemma follows then from Lemmas 4 and 5.
We now compare the utility derived from two occupations at a time. Lemmas 11 to
17 show the boundaries that arise from these comparisons. The proof of these lemmas
follows from Lemma 10. It is worth noticing that some boundaries only depend on the
level of wealth (the choice between being a worker and a banker), or exclusively on the
skill level (the choice between being a worker and an entrepreneur that saves). The rest
of the boundaries depend on a combination of both wealth and skill level.
Lemma 11. Let
aW;B  w
1+rB
1+rD
 
1+   1
:
If a  aW;B then (z; a) 62 W and if a < aW;B then (z; a) 62 B.
Lemma 12. Let
zW;ED =

1
1  
1  1


w(1 + rD):
If z < zW;ED then (z; a) 62 ED and if z  zW;ED then (z; a) 62 W.
Lemma 13. Let
W;EO(a) = 
1 (1 + rD)
w

a+ w
1 + 
 1+


1 + 
a
 1+

:
If z < W;EO(a) then (z; a) 62 EO and if z  W;EO(a) then (z; a) 62 W.
Lemma 14. Let
W;EL(z) =
w   (1  )

1+rL
1+rD
 
1+

z
1+rL
 1
1   
w
 
1 
1+rL
1+rD
 
1+   1
:
If a < W;EL(z) then (z; a) 62 EL and if a  W;EL(z) then (z; a) 62 W.
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Lemma 15. Let
B;ED(z) =
(1  )

z
1+rD
 1
1   
w
 
1 
1+rB
1+rD
 
1+   1
:
If a  B;ED(z) then (z; a) 62 ED and if a < B;ED(z) then (z; a) 62 B.
Lemma 16. Let
B;EO(z) =
1

(1 + )
1+
(1 )
(1 + )
1+
(1 )

z
1 + rB
 1
1  
w
 
1 
:
If a  B;EO(z) then (z; a) 62 EO and if a < B;EO(z) then (z; a) 62 B.
Lemma 17. Let
B;EL(z) =
(1  )

z
1+rL
 1
1   
w
 
1 
1+rB
1+rL
 
1+   1
:
If a  B;EL(z) then (z; a) 62 EL and if a < B;EL(z) then (z; a) 62 B.
Additionally to the boundaries shown in the previous lemmas, there are two other
boundaries we need to take into account: ED;EO(z) and EO;EL(z). As mentioned in
Lemma 5,
ED;EO(z) 
1 + 


z
1 + rD
 1
1  
w
 
1 
EO;EL(z) 
1 + 


z
1 + rL
 1
1  
w
 
1 
:
Entrepreneurs with a < EO;EL(z) will borrow, entrepreneurs with a  ED;EO(z) will
save, and entrepreneurs with EO;EL(z)  a < ED;EO(z) will spend all their available
wealth in paying for workers. It is worth mentioning that these boundaries do not
depend on utility, but rather on feasibility: If an entrepreneur borrows (sE(z; a) < 0)
then this entrepreneur cannot choose to save.
Proposition 4 characterizes the sets of consumers. There are three cases: If the
spread between the return of setting up a bank, rB, and the interest rate on deposits,
rD is suciently low, then there will be three types of entrepreneurs. On the other
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extreme, if the spread between rB and the interest rate on loans, rL is suciently large,
in equilibrium there will only be entrepreneurs that borrow.
Proposition 4. If in equilibrium

1+
1+
 1+
  1+rB
1+rD
, then there will be the three types
of entrepreneurs. In this case the occupational choice of consumers is characterized by
the following sets:
B = [z; zW;ED) [aW;B; a]
[
f(z; a) : z  zW;ED and a  B;ED(z)g
W = [z; zW;ED) [a; aW;B)
[
f(z; a) : z  zW;ED ; a  a; z < zW;EO;EL and z < W;EO(a)g[
f(z; a) : z  zW;EO;EL ; a  a and a < W;EL(z)g
ED = f(z; a) : z  zW;ED and ED;EO(z)  a < B;ED(z)g
EO = f(z; a) : z  W;EO(a) and EO;EL(z)  a < ED;EO(z)g
EL = f(z; a) : a  W;EL(z) and a  a < EO;EL(z)g ;
where
zW;EO;EL 

1

0BB@ 
(1 + )

1+rL
1+rD
 
1+   (1 + )
1CCA
1 
w(1 + rL):
If in equilibrium 1+r
B
1+rL


1+
1+
 1+

< 1+r
B
1+rD
, then there will be no entrepreneurs
that deposit. In this case the occupational choice of consumers is characterized by the
following sets:
B = [z; zW;B;EO) [aW;B; a]
[
f(z; a) : z  zW;B;EO and a  B;EO(z)g
W = [z; zW;B;EO) [a; aW;B)
[
f(z; a) : z  zW;B;EO ; a  a; z < zW;EO;EL and z < W;EO(a)g[
f(z; a) : z  zW;EO;EL ; a  a and a < W;EL(z)g
EO = f(z; a) : z  W;EO(a) and EO;EL(z)  a < B;EO(z)g
EL = f(z; a) : a  W;EL(z) and a  a < EO;EL(z)g ;
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where
zW;B;EO 
(1 + )
1+

(1 + )
1+


1

0BB@ 
1+rB
1+rD
 
1+   1
1CCA
1 
w(1 + rB):
If in equilibrium 1+r
B
1+rL
>

1+
1+
 1+

, then there will only be entrepreneurs that bor-
row. In this case the occupational choice of consumers is characterized by the following
sets:
B = [z; zW;B;EL) [aW;B; a]
[
f(z; a) : z  zW;B;EL and a  B;EL(z)g
W = [z; zW;B;EL) [a; aW;B)
[
f(z; a) : z  zW;B;EL ; a  a and a < W;EL(z)g
EL = f(z; a) : a  W;EL(z) and a  a < B;EL(z)g :
where
zW;B;EL 

1
1  
1  1

0BB@

1+rB
1+rL
 
1+   1
1+rB
1+rD
 
1+   1
1CCA
1 
w(1 + rL):
Proof. The strategy to prove the proposition relies on the fact that, depending on the
values of 1+r
B
1+rD
and 1+r
B
1+rL
, some types of entrepreneurs will not exist. This will be a
consequence of the slope of some boundaries.
First, recall from Lemma 3 that rB > rL > rD in equilibrium as long as  <1. Let
aW;ED;EO =
1 + 
(1  )w:
Notice that
B;ED (zW;ED) = aW;B
W;EO (aW;ED;EO) = zW;ED
ED;EO (zW;ED) = aW;ED;EO :
As long as aW;B  aW;ED;EO there will exist entrepreneurs that save in equilibrium.
aW;B  aW;ED;EO and B;ED(z)  ED;EO(z) if and only if

1+
1+
 1+
  1+rB
1+rD
. Finally,
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EO;EL(z) > ED;EO(z) since r
L > rD, so if

1+
1+
 1+
  1+rB
1+rD
there will be entrepreneurs
that neither borrow nor deposit.
Now consider the case where there are no entrepreneurs that save in equilibrium.
Notice that
W;EO (aW;B) = zW;B;EO
B;EO (zW;B;EO) = aW;B:
Let
aW;EO;EL 
1 + 
(1 + )

1+rL
1+rD
 
1+   (1 + )
w:
Notice that
W;EO (aW;EO;EL) = zW;EO;EL
EO;EL (zW;EO;EL) = aW;EO;EL
W;EL (zW;EO;EL) = aW;EO;EL ;
so as long as aW;B  aW;EO;EL there will exist entrepreneurs that neither borrow nor
save. aW;B  aW;EO;EL and B;EO(z)  EO;EL(z) if and only if

1+
1+
 1+
  1+rB
1+rL
.
Finally notice that
W;EL (zW;B;EL) = aW;B
B;EL (zW;B;EL) = aW;B:
If

1+
1+
 1+

< 1+r
B
1+rL
there will only be entrepreneurs that borrow in equilibrium.
Lemma 18 determines the skill level z0W;EL above which there will be no workers.
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Lemma 18. Let
z
a
W;EL =
0BBB@
w   a

1+rL
1+rD
 
1+   1

1  
1CCCA
1  w


(1 + rL)

1 + rD
1 + rL
(1 )
1+
Then
W;EL

z
a
W;EL

= a:
C.2 Characterizing the boundaries that determine the oc-
cupational choice as !1
In this section we will characterize the boundaries that determine the occupational
choice of consumers given values of w and r. Consumers will choose their occupation
depending on the utility they can derive from it (see (3.9)). Lemma 19 characterizes
the utility derived from each occupation.
Lemma 19. The utility of consumer (z; a) is
u(z; a) =
8><>:
(1 + ) ln a+w1+ +  ln(1 + r) if (z; a) 2 W
(1 + ) ln

a
1+ +
1 
1+

z
1+r
 1
1   
w
 
1 

+  ln(1 + r) if (z; a) 2 E :
Proof. In this model c2(z; a) = (1 + r)c1(z; a) for all consumers (z; a). Therefore
u(z; a) = (1 + ) ln c1 +  ln(1 + r):
The proof of the lemma follows from Lemmas 6 and 7.
We now compare the utility derived from the two occupations. Lemma 20 shows
the boundary that arises from this comparison. The proof of this lemma follows from
Lemma 19. It is worth noticing that this boundary only depends on the skill level.
Lemma 20. Let
zW;E 

1
1  
1  1


w(1 + r):
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If z < zW;E then (z; a) 2 W and if z  zW;E then (z; a) 2 E.
Proposition 5 characterizes the sets of consumers.
Proposition 5. Consumer occupations are characterized by
W = f(z; a) : z < zW;Eg
E = f(z; a) : z  zW;Eg :
C.2.1 Solving the model
Let
A 
Z
adG(z  a)
Since for each individual, consumption in the two periods is related by
c2(z; a) = (1 + r)c1(z; a):
This must also hold in summation, which implies:Z
c2(z; a)dG(z  a) =
Z
(1 + r)c1(z; a)dG(z  a): (C.1)
We use Lemmas 7 and 20 and the market clearing condition for labor to solve for
Cw;r  w(1 + r). This allows us to have an expression for total production. Then we
use A and total production to solve for r using (C.1). Finally we solve for w.
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C.3 Social Planner Problem
The Social Planner Problem is
max
l(z);c1(z;a);c2(z;a);o
Z
(v(c1(z; a) + v(c2(z; a))) dG(z  a)Z
c1(z; a)dG(z  a) =
Z
adG(z  a)Z
c2(z; a)dG(z  a) =
Z
E
zl(z)dG(z  a)Z
E
l(z)dG(z  a) =
Z
W
dG(z  a):
Notice that aggregate consumption in period 1 is exogenous, so maximizing social
welfare implies maximizing production in the second period. Now, the marginal pro-
ductivity of labor is constant across all rms, but adding an extra entrepreneur implies
increasing the marginal productivity of labor, since the average size of a rm decreases.
So solving the Social Planner Problem reduces to nding a boundary above which con-
sumers will become entrepreneurs. We know that
l(z) =
 z
MPL
 1
1 
:
From the labor market clearing condition we have
 
MPL
 1
1 
Z
zzW;E
z
1
1 dG(z  a) = G^(zW;E);
where
G^(z0) 
Z
z<z0
dG(z  a):
Then
MPL = 
0@(1  G^(zW;E))E
h
z
1
1  jz  zW;E
i
G^(zW;E)
1A1  :
110
The Social Planner Problem is equivalent to
max
zW;E
H(zW;E)  max
zW;E
Z
E
zf(l(z))dG(z  a)
= max
zW;E


MPL(zW;E)
 
1 
Z
zzW;E
z
1
1 dG(z  a)
= max
zW;E

1  G^(zW;E)
1 
E
h
z
1
1  jz  zW;E
i1 
G^(zW;E):
C.4 Select Proofs
C.4.1 Proof of Lemma 8
To prove this Lemma it is sucient to consider aggregate wealth across the dierent
occupational choices. That is, let AO denote the aggregate wealth endowed to consumers
who choose occupation O, where O 2 fW;B; EL; EO; EDg. Additionally, let
ZED 
Z
ED
z
1
1 dG(z  a)
1 
ZEL 
Z
EL
z
1
1 dG(z  a)
1 
:
That is, Z
1
1 
ED (Z
1
1 
EL ) is the
1
1  -th moment of the skill endowed to the entrepreneurs
that are depositors (borrowers). Finally let MW be the mass of workers:
MW 
Z
W
dG(z  a):
Then the market clearing condition for deposits can be written as

1 + 
(wMW +AW) +

1 + 
AED  
1 + 
1 + 

ZED
1 + rD
 1
1  
w
 
1 
= 

1 + 
AB; (C.2)
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for loans as

1 + 
AEL  
1 + 
1 + 

ZEL
1 + rL
 1
1  
w
 
1 
+ (1 + )

1 + 
AB = 0; (C.3)
and for labor as
MW =

ZEL
(1 + rL)w
 1
1 
+

1 + 
AEO
w
+

ZED
(1 + rD)w
 1
1 
: (C.4)
(C.2) and (C.3) can rewritten as (C.5) and (C.6), respectively.

ZEL
(1 + rL)w
 1
1 
=

1 + 
(AEL + (1 + )AB)

w
(C.5)
ZED
(1 + rD)w
 1
1 
=

1 + 
(wMW +AW +AED   AB)

w
: (C.6)
Plugging (C.5) and (C.6) into the labor market clearing condition we get
MW =

1 + 
(AEL + (1 + )AB)

w
+

1 + 
AEO
w
+

1 + 
(wMW +AW +AED   AB)

w
:
(C.7)
The result follows from reorganizing (C.7).
C.4.2 Assumptions on parameters in Section 3.5.2
The following assumptions on parameters guarantee that the prices stated in Proposition
2 are an equilibrium:
z2 >

1
1  
1  1


w(1 + rL) > z1:
This assumption guarantees that consumers with z = z2 choose to become entrepreneurs
are entrepreneurs while the other consumers don't.
a2 >
w
1+rB
1+rD
 
1+   1
> a1:
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This assumption guarantees that consumers with a = a2 choose to become bankers and
consumers with a = a1 choose to become workers.
a >
1 + 


z2
1 + rD
 1
1  
w
 
1 
:
This assumption guarantees that there are entrepreneurs that deposit.
0 < (  )(1  a)za2   (1  z)a
2
  (1 + )aza1 < (1  z)a
2
:
The rst inequality is consistent with the existence of consumers other than workers
that save; namely, entrepreneurs that deposit. The second inequality is consistent with
the existence of consumers that do not save; namely. entrepreneurs that borrow and
entrepreneurs that neither borrow nor deposit.
(1 + )(1  a)za2
<
 
1  z
2a
 1
2
 

(  )(1  a)za2   (1  z)a
2
  (1 + )aza1
 1
2
!2
:
This nal assumption guarantees that rL > rD, which is necessary to have an equilib-
rium.
C.4.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The strategy to prove this proposition will be to assume that parameter values are
such that an equilibrium exist. Then we show that the conditions on this parameters
satisfy what is stated in C.4.2. We will also build on the proof of Lemma 8. Given the
denitions in C.4.1, under eG() we have
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MW = az
AW = a1az
AB = a2(1  a)z
AED =
1  z
a
Z a
ED;EO (z)
ada (C.8)
AEL =
1  z
a
Z EO;EL (z)
0
ada
ZED = z2

1  z
a
1 
(a  ED;EO(z))1 
ZEL = z2

1  z
a
1 
(EO;EL(z))
1  :
Reorganizing (C.5) and (C.6) we get
1 + rL = ZEL

w
 1 + 
 (AEL + (1 + )AB)
1 
1 + rD = ZED

w
 1 + 
 (wMW +AW +AED   AB)
1 
: (C.9)
The result follows form plugging (C.8) into (C.9), and using the result from Lemma
8. The proof that the assumptions stated in C.4.2 are sucient restrictions on the
parameters arises from guaranteeing that there are no negative roots in the resulting
rL and rD and by using the characterization of the boundaries that determine the
occupational choices in the model (See C.1).
C.4.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of this proposition relies on the result stated in Proposition 2. Notice that
MW and A are constant in the model. Then we can write rL and rD as
1 + rL =
z2

(1 + )1 

MW
A

C
1 
2
L
1 + rD =
z2

(1 + )1 

MW
A

C1 D :
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Notice that rL   rD is a function of CL   CD. Furthermore, from the corollary to
Proposition 2 this dierence is decreasing in .
Now, total production in this economy is given by the sum of what is produced by
each type of entrepreneur. Let YT be total production by entrepreneur of type T , where
T 2 fL;O;Dg. Taking into account the results in Proposition 2 and Lemma 5 we have
YL = z2
1  z
a

1
1 + 
MW
A
 1
CL
 1+
2
YO = z2
1  z
a

1
1 + 
MW
A
 1
1 + 
"
1
CD
1+
 

1
CL
 1+
2
#
YD = z2
1  z
a

1
1 + 
MW
A

a  1CD

1
CD

:
The result follows from adding YT for T 2 fL;O;Dg.
C.4.5 Proof of Lemma 9
The proof of this lemma relies on what is proven in C.1. First, from Proposition 4 we
see that a consumer with skill z1 and wealth a1 choose to be an entrepreneur that is
able to use its wealth to pay for workers. Additionally, if a = 0 a consumer with skill z2
and wealth a = 0 chooses to become an entrepreneur that needs to borrow to pay for
workers according to Lemma 12 and Proposition 4. Finally,
z2   z1 =

1
1  
1  1


(1 + rD)
(1 )
1+
h
(1 + rL)
1+
1+   (1 + rD) 1+1+
i
;
which is increasing in rL   rD.
